> The core of my complaint is that even though our old PRNG did crappy > entropy handling, we used to have such a method, which is now gone. I'd > like to see yarrow hang off /dev/urandom and have /dev/random tap directly > into the entropy pool (perhaps a third pool separate from Yarrow's > fast/slow) so I can generate my large keys safely. By your own admission, the old system was bad; yet you still want ${it}? You'd like to see a programmer with less experience than Schneier come up with a more secure algorithm than him? M -- Mark Murray Join the anti-SPAM movement: http://www.cauce.org To Unsubscribe: send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with "unsubscribe freebsd-current" in the body of the message
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Kris Kennaway
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Stefan `Sec` Zehl
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Poul-Henning Kamp
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Stefan `Sec` Zehl
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Kris Kennaway
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Jeroen C. van Gelderen
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Rodney W. Grimes
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering is... Dan Moschuk
- Re: randomdev entropy gatheri... Jeroen C. van Gelderen
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Steve Kargl
- Re: randomdev entropy gat... Mark Murray
- RE: randomdev entropy gat... David Schwartz
- RE: randomdev entropy gat... Kris Kennaway
- Re: randomdev entropy gathering is really weak Trevor Johnson