It appears that Steve Crocker <[email protected]> said: >But as I write this, I realize the keytag is generated using the key. >Different Signers are *highly* likely to have different keys, so there's no >need to create a salt. (It's been a *long* time since I looked at the >algorithms.)
The keytag is a 16 bit checksum of the key, made using roughly the same checksum scheme used in TCP. Due to regularities in the keys there is only about 14 bits of entropy in the checksum. It is easy to futz with the bits to create a bogus key with any desired tag, but I don't know of any way to create real keys with tags in a desired range that is better than trying repeatedly until you get one you like. Or, as I may have suggested once or twice, since keytag collisions have never been a problem other than in contrived examples like keytrap, and resolvers already defend against that, there is no remaining problem to solve, and the senisble thing to do is nothing. R's, John _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
