Nguyễn Đình Nam wrote:
What you're trying to do is a "who is watching the watchers" kind thing...
...Every existing CA [...] made a promise to comply to the universal PKI
> trust policy, we just need a scheme to enforce their promise. If we need a scheme to enforce some TTP's promise of uncorruptibility, he evidently does not qualify as a Trusted Third Party. CHHIC controversy has exposed the fallacy of current SSL implementation premise, i.e., that there can exist a large (and growing!) number of TTPs that would be selected by a software vendor and then be trusted by the whole population of users of their family of computer communication applications. This does not mean that the certificate verification mechanics are at fault; it only means that CA selection protocol has not been thought out properly: it limped along with a handful of CAs, it is showing the serious symptoms of the malaise with hundreds. In the meantime, does anybody here have any estimate of the number of CAs we expect to be around in the foreseeable future? And what was the number of CAs anticipated when the current anointment protocol was conceived? If the above is correct - and I just don't think how one could argue otherwise - the ONLY solution is to put the selection of TTPs back into the hands of communicating parties. And not as an option, but as a default. Otherwise (as it was correctly observed in one of the previous messages), we can add layers upon layers of "watcher watchers" without ever addressing the fundamental problem. MacRober -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
