At 8:26 PM +0200 1/12/09, Eddy Nigg wrote: >On 01/12/2009 03:59 PM, Rob Stradling: >> >>Right now, as I see it, we have... >>1). "potential" - The "Potentially Problematic Practices" wiki page. >>2). "actual" - The Mozilla CA Certificate Policy. >> >>So when a problem "is shown to have moved from 'potential' to 'actual'", >>surely the way to address it would be to update the Mozilla CA Certificate >>Policy and require CAs to conform to the new version (or risk having their >>Root(s) pulled) ? >> > >Should the fact that MD5 is viewed as insecure or insufficient for the >assigned purpose be especially listed in the Mozilla CA Policy?
No, because it is not true. What is true is that signing with MD5 is now considered to be insecure, and what Mozilla will do about it. >Should every possible algorithm be listed there too? Probably, yes. That is, every allowed signing algorithm should be listed; we obviously don't need a list of the non-allowed algorithms. >Does your CA policy and practice statements list any algorithm you don't >intend to use for the same reasons? We should not be relying on CA's CPSs: we should be relying on our own view of what is good-enough security. >Or supposed Mozilla deems certain practices in relation to RAs and/or >intermediate CAs an unnecessary risk and problematic, does this have to be >explicitly stated in the Mozilla CA Policy? Yes. > If yes, what else must be stated there or is the intend of the policy clear > enough? Everything that we know that some CAs might do wrong that is not acceptable to Mozilla should be listed there. As we discover new categories (in this case, "uses unsafe algorithm"), it should be added. That list is not going to be long, but it *will* be valuable. --Paul Hoffman _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
