Frank Hecker wrote, On 2008-06-20 17:26:
> As promised, here is an update on where things stand with regard to 
> DigiNotar and Entrust. (Since a lot of this is based on information I 
> got from Nelson, he's invited to point out where I got things wrong.)
> 
> First, a recap for those who've forgotten:

[snip]

> So the bottom line is that there are still unanswered questions, and I'm 
> going to spend some more time trying to get them answered if I can.

Frank, I think your recap of the situation is correct.

The Diginotar email situation is an issue today, regardless of whether
or not a Diginotar root CA cert is added to the trusted root list.
It came to our attention during the course of evaluating Diginotar's
request to have their root included, but it exists regardless of the
outcome of that request.

I am confident that removing the email trust flag from the Entrust root
that cross certified the Diginotar root key would effectively stop certs
issued by Diginotar from being treated as valid email certs.  This is the
only method in which I am confident, today.

We have entertained the idea that NSS could actively distrust an
intermediate CA cert for a certain usage (such as email), even if its
issuer was trusted for that usage. But today I am NOT confident that any
presently-released version of NSS correctly and effectively implements
that active distrust.  (I could test that in a day or two if I had an
appropriate and relevant cert chain with which to test.)

I agree with others who have expressed the idea that Mozilla really should
get Entrust to step in and address this problem.  If, at some point, they
revoke their old cross cert, and Mozilla products continue to honor the
revoked cert because of revocation deficiencies in NSS, then that would
be a problem on our shoulders, but I do not think our first action should
be one that presumes that Entrust will not do that, nor should it be one
that relieves Entrust of any obligation or motivation to take that action.

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