We've actually had a discussion on this topic very recently. My understanding of what we've learned from that discussion (feel free to chime in if I'm not understanding properly):
1) The NIST (a US organization) states that after December 31, 2010, nobody should be using 1024-bit RSA keys to protect information. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57-Part1-revised2_Mar08-2007.pdf 2) There needs to be a mechanism to enforce this in NSS; the PKCS#11 validity period information provides a location to set such (since PKCS#11 states that it is up to the application to set this equal to the validity period of the underlying certificate or leave it unset). 3) Mozilla needs to change policy such that new 1024-bit root requests are denied, since they won't be valid for more than a few months even if they're approved. (If it takes an average of 12 months to evaluate a CA, then it'll be at least July 2009 before they're approved for inclusion, and thus won't be able to be valid (given #1) for more than 17 months regardless. -Kyle H On Wed, Jun 11, 2008 at 1:31 AM, Jean-Marc Desperrier <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Kaspersky Lab announces the launch of Stop Gpcode, an international > initiative against the blackmailer virus > http://www.kaspersky.com/news?id=207575651 > > If Kaspersky has made the analyze, and breaking a 1024 bit key is > reasonnably within reach of a distributed effort, that means nobody > should be using a 1024 key today for really important security. > > Gulp :-( > _______________________________________________ > dev-tech-crypto mailing list > dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto > _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
