On Sun, Nov 15, 2026 at 11:14:23PM +0700, Max Nikulin wrote:
> On 13/11/2026 9:28 am, Elven Inquisition wrote:
> > He noted in his initial reply to me in this thread[2] that
> > the upgrade process during netinstall utilizes unattended-upgrades. That
> > utilizes APT internally.
> 
> I think, unattended-upgrades is not involved and apt is invoked directly. In
> Debian it is not installed by default, see
>     apt list
> '(~D~nunattended-upgrades)|(~DRecommends:~nunattended-upgrades)'
> 
> Perhaps the point was that users having unattended-upgrades got fixed apt
> version rather early. In my opinion however, this case should be handled
> manually to upgrade apt safely.
> 

Yes, if you had unattended-ugrades, this would be fixed quickly. I can't 
remember who raised this first - maybe Elven Inquisition?? - and asked why
there hadn't been a full point release immediately.

I'm not sure that everyone involved actually understands what a point release
is. A point release - now almost exactly every two months - rolls up all
the security releases and brings you up to current. At that point - on a 
fixed date, known in advance, the release team will push out a point release
(and the media/images team will build and test install images).

If you've been running apt to update yourself on a fairly regular basis,
you already *have* pretty much all the packages that go into a point
release apart from the base-files patch thta actually bumps the number.

The apt fix was available from debian-security pretty much immediately on
the public announcement for both Debian and Ubuntu - apart from being 
recommended for immediate application on the day, there was pretty
much nothing to see, at least in my opinion.

The next scheduled release will be next weekend UK time - almost certainly
early Saturday morning, with images being built immedidately thereafter.
As ever, you don't *have* to have the latest install medium - any
install that involves a network being active updates from the network
before the completion of the install.

> > it's not a *full* mitigation. The mirror itself can still ship malicious
> > packages;
> 
> I hope, no official mirrors are compromised. It is responsibility of users
> to evaluate reputation of mirrors they use. I expect that attacks by 3rd
> party is more probable.
> 

You can be fairly sure that deb.debian.org (globally available) or
ftp.[country name].debian.org won't have been compromised - it's quite
a significant effort to compromise a whole mirror without detection
somewhere.

> By the way, may local mirror (e.g. apt-cacher-ng) be a workaround against
> the attack?
> 

Where does your *local* mirror derive its .deb files from?

> 
> Currently due to high rate of discovered vulnerabilities, a release with
> single bug update may cause user confusion. Other updates may be rather
> important as well.
> 
> I am afraid, emergency releases are bearable only if images testing are
> fully automated.
> 
> > As I noted in my initial email, the "mitigation" instructions in
> > this case seem to be, by virtue of their absence, "Upgrade as usual.
> 

The mitigation instructions for pretty much any security update are
"Update" (and probably reboot if the updates include a kernel/ significant
numbers of libraries / your preferred web browser. Massively long uptimes
are not normally a thing to boast about - they might indicate that you've
never installed updates :)

> I agree that handling of this couple of issues was not optimal. It is the
> reason why I joined this thread.
> 
> > I wasn't subscribed when I posted, and I hadn't expected to be
> > dropped. I'm subscribed now, though.
> Perhaps I have seen a suggestion to explicitly request "Cc" in some docs
> related to Debian mailing lists.
> 

The suggestion made in the monthly FAQ is that you *don't* cc people
if they are subscribed to the list.

> My rule of thumb for mailing lists where direct copies are frequently used
> is that if a person joined an earlier started thread than their address may
> be skipped. An exception is the case when it is important to hear their
> opinion. For new threads I sometimes check if the person joined to other
> threads in the past.
> 
> On 13/11/2026 9:55 pm, monodev wrote:
> > On 11/12/26 6:19 PM, Max Nikulin wrote:
> > > I do not mind that new system is not vulnerable as soon as security
> > > updates are installed. So the window for attacks is narrow, but it exists.
> > In that case such a bug would no longer be addressed by a new point
> > release (emergency or otherwise) as it'd exist outside of both apt and
> > ca-certificates.
> 
> It is not outside of apt. The point is that earlier apt versions may
> overwrite a file after its hashsum is verified. GPG signatures for package
> lists are genuine, but attacker's code may be executed on the system.
>

There comes a point at which nothing can be trusted at all - it is for
each of you to determine your degree of mistrust for anything here. 

With every good wish, as ever,

Andrew Cater
([email protected])

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