On 2026-11-15, Max Nikulin <[email protected]> wrote:

>>> I do not mind that new system is not vulnerable as soon as security
>>> updates are installed. So the window for attacks is narrow, but it exists.
>> In that case such a bug would no longer be addressed by a new point
>> release (emergency or otherwise) as it'd exist outside of both apt and
>> ca-certificates.
>
> It is not outside of apt. The point is that earlier apt versions may 
> overwrite a file after its hashsum is verified. GPG signatures for 
> package lists are genuine, but attacker's code may be executed on the 
> system.
>

What is the upshot of all this for the end user (like me)?

Is this an AI trend that risks getting exponentially worse instead of
incrementally  better?

Reply via email to