On Sat, Feb 01, 2014 at 12:00:30 -0200, André Nunes Batista wrote:
>
> Isn't it the case where the randomness of the key/password composes the
> overall quality of the crypto substitutions in such a way that 4096bit
> keys would necessarily provide better protection against cryptanalysis
> when compared to dozens of random, valid characters?
As far as I understand it, that is correct: A 4096bit key gives you
2^4096 possibilities, while a string of n random characters selected
from a set of, let's say, 50 members (letters, numbers, special
characters) has 50^n possible values. To break even with the 4096bit
key, such a random-string password would therefore have to have a length
of n=4096*ln(2)/ln(50) characters, which is about 725.
--
Regards, |
Florian | http://www.florian-kulzer.eu
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