2014-01-31 Brian <a...@cityscape.co.uk>:

> On Fri 31 Jan 2014 at 07:56:29 +0100, Raffaele Morelli wrote:
>
> > Brian argued that a private key+allowusers does not improve security with
> > respect to passwords+allowusers.
>
> I did :).
>
> > I use private key authentication with a 21 characters passphrase which is
> > at minimum more secure than a 21 characters password and unless someone
> > kidnaps and tortures me for the passphrase and stoles one of my boxes for
> > the private key I wonder who can prove it is not.
>
> I think I see what you are getting at (please correct me if I am wrong).
>
> The passphrase protects the private key from being accessed. If there is
> no access to the private key then authentication cannot take place under
> any circumstances. It isn't even worthwhile trying. I agree with that.
>
> Because you need two things (passphrase + private key) you see this as
> being more secure than a password login because any Tom, Dick or Harry
> can throw passwords at sshd. Therefore this makes a password login
> *intrinsically* less secure. This is what I disagree with and would like
> to see some convincing evidence to support it. I hope I am not
> misrepresenting your view.
>

Here we go. To be more accurate, it's not that password login is less
secure, it's private key + passphrase that *adds* security because of its
nature.
That way, even a user who picks a weak passphrase has somewhat an increased
security.



> The myth has arisen because of so-called "script kiddy" probes. These
> are conducted on a level which is actually totally incompetent and
> stands no real chance of success but their existence is used to
> denigrate password logins. Even with a targeted *online* attack a good
> password has time on its side, just like a key.
>
> I've covered the argument in other posts; you would have to be very,
> very lucky to conduct a successful *online* exploit against a strong
> password.
>

Totally agree with this, my auth.log* are full of login attempts with
*stupid* user names, ridicoulus password dictionaries and root login
attempts.


> > C'mon, what's the matter with private key authentication and the OP
> request?
>
> There is nothing wrong with private key authentication. There is also
> nothing wrong with password authentication. You choose whichever one is
> suitable for your situation based on site policy and rational grounds.


/r

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