Your message dated Fri, 08 Dec 2006 22:32:06 +0000
with message-id <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
and subject line Bug#401913: fixed in gnupg2 2.0.0-5.2
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--- Begin Message ---
Package: gnupg2
Version: 2.0.0-5
Severity: grave
Tags: security upstream

From: Werner Koch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [Announce] GnuPG: remotely controllable function pointer 
[CVE-2006-6235]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], info-gnu@gnu.org
Date: Wed, 06 Dec 2006 16:55:52 +0100

     GnuPG: remotely controllable function pointer [CVE-2006-6235]
    ===============================================================
                              2006-12-04

Summary
=======

Tavis Ormandy of the Gentoo security team identified a severe and
exploitable bug in the processing of encrypted packets in GnuPG.

[ Please do not send private mail in response to this message.  The
  mailing list gnupg-devel is the best place to discuss this problem
  (please subscribe first so you don't need moderator approval [1]). ]


Impact
======

Using malformed OpenPGP packets an attacker is able to modify and
dereference a function pointer in GnuPG.  This is a remotely
exploitable bug and affects any use of GnuPG where an attacker can
control the data processed by GnuPG.  It is not necessary limited to
encrypted data, also signed data may be affected.

Affected versions: All versions of GnuPG   < 1.4.6 
                   All versions of GnuPG-2 < 2.0.2
                   All beta versions of GnuPG-2 (1.9.0 .. 1.9.95)
Affected tools: gpg, gpgv, gpg2 and gpgv2.
Affected platforms: All.

gpg-agent, gpgsm as well as other tools are not affected.

A workaround is not known. 

[...]

This is a patch against GnuPG 2.0.1. Change the directory to g10/ and
apply this patch.

2006-12-02  Werner Koch  <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

        * encr-data.c: Allocate DFX context on the heap and not on the
        stack.  Changes at several places.  Fixes CVE-2006-6235.
        

Index: encr-data.c
===================================================================
--- encr-data.c (revision 4352)
+++ encr-data.c (working copy)
@@ -39,16 +39,37 @@
 static int decode_filter ( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a,
                                        byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
 
-typedef struct 
+typedef struct decode_filter_context_s
 {
   gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd;
   gcry_md_hd_t mdc_hash;
   char defer[22];
   int  defer_filled;
   int  eof_seen;
-} decode_filter_ctx_t;
+  int  refcount;
+} *decode_filter_ctx_t;
 
 
+/* Helper to release the decode context.  */
+static void
+release_dfx_context (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx)
+{
+  if (!dfx)
+    return;
+
+  assert (dfx->refcount);
+  if ( !--dfx->refcount )
+    {
+      gcry_cipher_close (dfx->cipher_hd);
+      dfx->cipher_hd = NULL;
+      gcry_md_close (dfx->mdc_hash);
+      dfx->mdc_hash = NULL;
+      xfree (dfx);
+    }
+}
+
+
+
 /****************
  * Decrypt the data, specified by ED with the key DEK.
  */
@@ -62,7 +83,11 @@
   unsigned blocksize;
   unsigned nprefix;
   
-  memset( &dfx, 0, sizeof dfx );
+  dfx = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *dfx);
+  if (!dfx)
+    return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+  dfx->refcount = 1;
+
   if ( opt.verbose && !dek->algo_info_printed )
     {
       const char *s = gcry_cipher_algo_name (dek->algo);
@@ -77,20 +102,20 @@
     goto leave;
   blocksize = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen (dek->algo);
   if ( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 )
-    log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
+    log_fatal ("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
   nprefix = blocksize;
   if ( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) )
     BUG();
 
   if ( ed->mdc_method ) 
     {
-      if (gcry_md_open (&dfx.mdc_hash, ed->mdc_method, 0 ))
+      if (gcry_md_open (&dfx->mdc_hash, ed->mdc_method, 0 ))
         BUG ();
       if ( DBG_HASHING )
-        gcry_md_start_debug (dfx.mdc_hash, "checkmdc");
+        gcry_md_start_debug (dfx->mdc_hash, "checkmdc");
     }
 
-  rc = gcry_cipher_open (&dfx.cipher_hd, dek->algo,
+  rc = gcry_cipher_open (&dfx->cipher_hd, dek->algo,
                          GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
                          (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
                           | ((ed->mdc_method || dek->algo >= 100)?
@@ -104,7 +129,7 @@
 
 
   /* log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
-  rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (dfx.cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+  rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (dfx->cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
   if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY )
     {
       log_info(_("WARNING: message was encrypted with"
@@ -123,7 +148,7 @@
       goto leave;
     }
 
-  gcry_cipher_setiv (dfx.cipher_hd, NULL, 0);
+  gcry_cipher_setiv (dfx->cipher_hd, NULL, 0);
 
   if ( ed->len )
     {
@@ -144,8 +169,8 @@
           temp[i] = c;
     }
   
-  gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx.cipher_hd, temp, nprefix+2, NULL, 0);
-  gcry_cipher_sync (dfx.cipher_hd);
+  gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, temp, nprefix+2, NULL, 0);
+  gcry_cipher_sync (dfx->cipher_hd);
   p = temp;
   /* log_hexdump( "prefix", temp, nprefix+2 ); */
   if (dek->symmetric
@@ -155,17 +180,18 @@
       goto leave;
     }
   
-  if ( dfx.mdc_hash )
-    gcry_md_write (dfx.mdc_hash, temp, nprefix+2);
-  
+  if ( dfx->mdc_hash )
+    gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, temp, nprefix+2);
+
+  dfx->refcount++;
   if ( ed->mdc_method )
-    iobuf_push_filter( ed->buf, mdc_decode_filter, &dfx );
+    iobuf_push_filter ( ed->buf, mdc_decode_filter, dfx );
   else
-    iobuf_push_filter( ed->buf, decode_filter, &dfx );
+    iobuf_push_filter ( ed->buf, decode_filter, dfx );
 
   proc_packets ( procctx, ed->buf );
   ed->buf = NULL;
-  if ( ed->mdc_method && dfx.eof_seen == 2 )
+  if ( ed->mdc_method && dfx->eof_seen == 2 )
     rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
   else if ( ed->mdc_method )
     { 
@@ -184,26 +210,28 @@
          bytes are appended.  */
       int datalen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (ed->mdc_method);
 
-      gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx.cipher_hd, dfx.defer, 22, NULL, 0);
-      gcry_md_write (dfx.mdc_hash, dfx.defer, 2);
-      gcry_md_final (dfx.mdc_hash);
+      assert (dfx->cipher_hd);
+      assert (dfx->mdc_hash);
+      gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, dfx->defer, 22, NULL, 0);
+      gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, dfx->defer, 2);
+      gcry_md_final (dfx->mdc_hash);
 
-      if (dfx.defer[0] != '\xd3' || dfx.defer[1] != '\x14' )
+      if (dfx->defer[0] != '\xd3' || dfx->defer[1] != '\x14' )
         {
           log_error("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
           rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
         }
       else if (datalen != 20
-               || memcmp (gcry_md_read (dfx.mdc_hash, 0),dfx.defer+2,datalen))
+               || memcmp (gcry_md_read (dfx->mdc_hash, 0),
+                          dfx->defer+2,datalen ))
         rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-      /* log_printhex("MDC message:", dfx.defer, 22); */
-      /* log_printhex("MDC calc:", gcry_md_read (dfx.mdc_hash,0), datalen); */
+      /* log_printhex("MDC message:", dfx->defer, 22); */
+      /* log_printhex("MDC calc:", gcry_md_read (dfx->mdc_hash,0), datalen); */
     }
   
   
  leave:
-  gcry_cipher_close (dfx.cipher_hd);
-  gcry_md_close (dfx.mdc_hash);
+  release_dfx_context (dfx);
   return rc;
 }
 
@@ -214,7 +242,7 @@
 mdc_decode_filter (void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a,
                    byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
 {
-  decode_filter_ctx_t *dfx = opaque;
+  decode_filter_ctx_t dfx = opaque;
   size_t n, size = *ret_len;
   int rc = 0;
   int c;
@@ -226,11 +254,11 @@
     }
   else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW )
     {
-      assert(a);
-      assert( size > 44 );
+      assert (a);
+      assert ( size > 44 );
       
       /* Get at least 22 bytes and put it somewhere ahead in the buffer. */
-      for(n=22; n < 44 ; n++ )
+      for (n=22; n < 44 ; n++ )
         {
           if( (c = iobuf_get(a)) == -1 )
             break;
@@ -279,8 +307,10 @@
 
       if ( n )
         {
-          gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, buf, n, NULL, 0);
-          gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, buf, n);
+          if ( dfx->cipher_hd )
+            gcry_cipher_decrypt (dfx->cipher_hd, buf, n, NULL, 0);
+          if ( dfx->mdc_hash )
+            gcry_md_write (dfx->mdc_hash, buf, n);
        }
       else
         {
@@ -289,6 +319,10 @@
        }
       *ret_len = n;
     }
+  else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) 
+    {
+      release_dfx_context (dfx);
+    }
   else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC ) 
     {
       *(char**)buf = "mdc_decode_filter";
@@ -300,7 +334,7 @@
 static int
 decode_filter( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
 {
-  decode_filter_ctx_t *fc = opaque;
+  decode_filter_ctx_t fc = opaque;
   size_t n, size = *ret_len;
   int rc = 0;
   
@@ -311,11 +345,18 @@
       if ( n == -1 )
         n = 0;
       if ( n )
-        gcry_cipher_decrypt (fc->cipher_hd, buf, n, NULL, 0);
+        {
+          if (fc->cipher_hd)
+            gcry_cipher_decrypt (fc->cipher_hd, buf, n, NULL, 0);
+        }
       else
         rc = -1; /* EOF */
       *ret_len = n;
     }
+  else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE ) 
+    {
+      release_dfx_context (fc);
+    }
   else if ( control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC )
     {
       *(char**)buf = "decode_filter";


--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Source: gnupg2
Source-Version: 2.0.0-5.2

We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of
gnupg2, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive:

gnupg-agent_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
  to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg-agent_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.diff.gz
  to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.diff.gz
gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.dsc
  to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.dsc
gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
  to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
gpgsm_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
  to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gpgsm_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb



A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is
attached.

Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed.  If you
have further comments please address them to [EMAIL PROTECTED],
and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate.

Debian distribution maintenance software
pp.
Andreas Barth <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (supplier of updated gnupg2 package)

(This message was generated automatically at their request; if you
believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive
administrators by mailing [EMAIL PROTECTED])


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

Format: 1.7
Date: Fri,  8 Dec 2006 20:16:34 +0000
Source: gnupg2
Binary: gnupg2 gpgsm gnupg-agent
Architecture: source amd64
Version: 2.0.0-5.2
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: high
Maintainer: Eric Dorland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Changed-By: Andreas Barth <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Description: 
 gnupg-agent - GNU privacy guard - password agent
 gnupg2     - GNU privacy guard - a free PGP replacement
 gpgsm      - GNU privacy guard - S/MIME version
Closes: 401913
Changes: 
 gnupg2 (2.0.0-5.2) unstable; urgency=high
 .
   * Non-maintainer upload.
   * Fix arbitrary indirect call in GnuPG, CVE-2006-6235. Closes: #401913
Files: 
 0df7e640f1b255e02b2c29e05996f62e 859 utils optional gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.dsc
 596dfe21ad495ca97a58e625aa7142eb 196405 utils optional gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.diff.gz
 167c33c76d4c171d659f052547c355ed 216816 utils optional 
gnupg-agent_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
 185d2a797b099ae6ca2a743766caf234 364776 utils optional 
gpgsm_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
 34caf190b4e03f4b0059c9d642411a96 1031564 utils extra gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb

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Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux)

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Sq7fngoy/poUPPp1r0H7ZVY=
=W4hK
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


--- End Message ---

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