Your message dated Fri, 08 Dec 2006 22:32:06 +0000
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and subject line Bug#401913: fixed in gnupg2 2.0.0-5.2
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--- Begin Message ---
Package: gnupg2
Version: 1.9.15-4
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole
http://lwn.net/Articles/212909/
From: Werner Koch <wk-AT-g10code.com>
To: bugtraq-AT-securityfocus.com
Subject: GnuPG: remotely controllable function pointer [CVE-2006-6235]
Date: Wed, 06 Dec 2006 16:58:16 +0100
Cc: lwn-AT-lwn.net
GnuPG: remotely controllable function pointer [CVE-2006-6235]
===============================================================
2006-12-04
Summary
=======
Tavis Ormandy of the Gentoo security team identified a severe and
exploitable bug in the processing of encrypted packets in GnuPG.
[ Please do not send private mail in response to this message. The
mailing list gnupg-devel is the best place to discuss this problem
(please subscribe first so you don't need moderator approval [1]). ]
Impact
======
Using malformed OpenPGP packets an attacker is able to modify and
dereference a function pointer in GnuPG. This is a remotely
exploitable bug and affects any use of GnuPG where an attacker can
control the data processed by GnuPG. It is not necessary limited to
encrypted data, also signed data may be affected.
Affected versions: All versions of GnuPG < 1.4.6
All versions of GnuPG-2 < 2.0.2
All beta versions of GnuPG-2 (1.9.0 .. 1.9.95)
Affected tools: gpg, gpgv, gpg2 and gpgv2.
Affected platforms: All.
gpg-agent, gpgsm as well as other tools are not affected.
A workaround is not known.
Solution
========
If you are using a vendor supplied version of GnuPG:
* Wait for an update from your vendor. Vendors have been informed on
Saturday December 2, less than a day after this bug has been reported.
If you are using GnuPG 1.4:
* Update as soon as possible to GnuPG 1.4.6. It has been uploaded to
the usual location: ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/gcrypt/gnupg/. This version
was due to be released anyway this week. See
http://www.gnupg.org/download/ for details.
* Or: As another and less intrusive option, apply the attached patch
to GnuPG 1.4.5. This is the smallest possible fix.
If you are using GnuPG 2.0:
* Apply the attached patch against GnuPG 2.0.1.
* Or: Stop using gpg2 and gpgv2, install GnuPG 1.4.6 and use gpg and gpgv
instead.
If you are using a binary Windows version of GnuPG:
* A binary version of GnuPG 1.4.6 for Windows is available as usual.
* Gpg4win 1.0.8, including GnuPG 1.4.6, is available. Please go to
http://www.gpg4win.org .
Background
==========
GnuPG uses data structures called filters to process OpenPGP messages.
These filters ware used in a similar way as a pipelines in the shell.
For communication between these filters context structures are used.
These are usually allocated on the stack and passed to the filter
functions. At most places the OpenPGP data stream fed into these
filters is closed before the context structure gets deallocated.
While decrypting encrypted packets, this may not happen in all cases
and the filter may use a void contest structure filled with garbage.
An attacker may control this garbage. The filter context includes
another context used by the low-level decryption to access the
decryption algorithm. This is done using a function pointer. By
carefully crafting an OpenPGP message, an attacker may control this
function pointer and call an arbitrary function of the process.
Obviously an exploit needs to prepared for a specific version,
compiler, libc, etc to be successful - but it is definitely doable.
Fixing this is obvious: We need to allocate the context on the heap
and use a reference count to keep it valid as long as either the
controlling code or the filter code needs it.
We have checked all other usages of such a stack based filter contexts
but fortunately found no other vulnerable places. This allows to
release a relatively small patch. However, for reasons of code
cleanness and easier audits we will soon start to change all these
stack based filter contexts to heap based ones.
Support
=======
g10 Code GmbH, a Duesseldorf based company owned and headed by GnuPG's
principal author, is currently funding GnuPG development. As evident
by the two vulnerabilities found within a week, a review of the entire
code base should be undertaken as soon as possible. As maintainers we
try to do our best and are working slowly through the code. The long
standing plan is to scrutinize the 2.0 code base, write more test
cases and to backport new fixes and cleanups to 1.4. However, as a
small company our resources are limited and we need to prioritize
other projects which get us actual revenues. Support contracts or
other financial backing would greatly help us to improve the quality
of GnuPG.
Thanks
======
Tavis Ormandy found this vulnerability.
[1] See http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel .
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Henrique Holschuh
--- End Message ---
--- Begin Message ---
Source: gnupg2
Source-Version: 2.0.0-5.2
We believe that the bug you reported is fixed in the latest version of
gnupg2, which is due to be installed in the Debian FTP archive:
gnupg-agent_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg-agent_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.diff.gz
to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.diff.gz
gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.dsc
to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.dsc
gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
gpgsm_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
to pool/main/g/gnupg2/gpgsm_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
A summary of the changes between this version and the previous one is
attached.
Thank you for reporting the bug, which will now be closed. If you
have further comments please address them to [EMAIL PROTECTED],
and the maintainer will reopen the bug report if appropriate.
Debian distribution maintenance software
pp.
Andreas Barth <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (supplier of updated gnupg2 package)
(This message was generated automatically at their request; if you
believe that there is a problem with it please contact the archive
administrators by mailing [EMAIL PROTECTED])
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Format: 1.7
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2006 20:16:34 +0000
Source: gnupg2
Binary: gnupg2 gpgsm gnupg-agent
Architecture: source amd64
Version: 2.0.0-5.2
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: high
Maintainer: Eric Dorland <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Changed-By: Andreas Barth <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Description:
gnupg-agent - GNU privacy guard - password agent
gnupg2 - GNU privacy guard - a free PGP replacement
gpgsm - GNU privacy guard - S/MIME version
Closes: 401913
Changes:
gnupg2 (2.0.0-5.2) unstable; urgency=high
.
* Non-maintainer upload.
* Fix arbitrary indirect call in GnuPG, CVE-2006-6235. Closes: #401913
Files:
0df7e640f1b255e02b2c29e05996f62e 859 utils optional gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.dsc
596dfe21ad495ca97a58e625aa7142eb 196405 utils optional gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2.diff.gz
167c33c76d4c171d659f052547c355ed 216816 utils optional
gnupg-agent_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
185d2a797b099ae6ca2a743766caf234 364776 utils optional
gpgsm_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
34caf190b4e03f4b0059c9d642411a96 1031564 utils extra gnupg2_2.0.0-5.2_amd64.deb
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--- End Message ---
