Charles,What do you mean by other non-magic ways? If you mean back-door
authorization hacks then I have to wonder about there being a dozen or so
methods that rely on coopting a mechanism other than an SVC/PC routine, a TRAPx
or MC instruction handler or a Program FLIH front-end that handles magic
instructions like 0x00FBAD.
Keven
On Sat, Aug 8, 2020 at 6:03 PM -0500, "Bernd Oppolzer"
<[email protected]> wrote:
I know of at least one event where a site specific SVC which allowed to
store into write protected storage
stopped a whole MVS system, involving thousand of users (IMS, TSO,
Batch, DB2, during day shift),
because the store went into address zero "by mistake".
Kind regards
Bernd
Am 08.08.2020 um 23:53 schrieb Paul Gilmartin:
> System Integrity is defined for MVS as the inability of any program
> not authorized by a mechanism under the customer's control to:
> • circumvent or disable store or fetch protection
> • access an OS password-protected or a RACF-protected resource (RACF is
> the Resource Access Control Facility), or
> • obtain control in an authorized state; that is, in supervisor state,
> with a protection key less than eight (8), or Authorized Program Facility
> (APF) authorized.
>
> Of course, "under the customer's control" is a key phrase.
