Hello,
 
> > While it is nice that you have concerns about my security in case I should 
> > have to deal with malicious servers,
> > I would prefer to have a choice. Maybe some setting wich allows me, based 
> > on the server URL (or if that's too
> > complicated for a start), to allow ../ in local externals paths or disallow 
> > this. With such a setting, SVN would
> > seamlessly allow us to use our current directory layout while maintaining 
> > the benefits of atimic checkins.

> Excuse me, but given the layout requirements you seek, can you get away with 
> symlinks?

I'm not sure symlinks under XP are powerfull enough and the use of them is not 
easy enough for my colloeagues.
I'd really prefer a externals based solution.

> There are too many cases where non-root users have access to Subversion 
> repositories for repositories that 
> get run by, and manipulated by, the root user. The possibility of escalation 
> attacks for *other* environments seems very large.

That is why I suggested a setting controlling this. The default could be to 
disallow it. You can misuse nearly 
everything! So nearly everything in the world should be disallowed. I also 
suggested that limiting this relative addressing
to a single level in the hierarchy (means only ../ instead of ../../) would be 
sufficient for must users and still keeping
a good deal of the security. And if you could enable this for individual 
"domains" only one can still limit it for local 
servers only. If properly implemented it will only do good for those needing it 
and no harm (unless misconfigured, but
that can be said for most configuration options in most software...)

=> I'll request that on the developer mailing list as suggested.

Best regards 

Markus Humm 

EB-EV
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ebm-papst Mulfingen GmbH & Co. KG
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________________________________

Von: Nico Kadel-Garcia [mailto:nka...@gmail.com] 
Gesendet: Freitag, 2. März 2012 13:13
An: Humm, Markus
Cc: Daniel Shahaf; users@subversion.apache.org
Betreff: Re: Feature request: allow for relative working copy paths in 
svn:externals definition





On Fri, Mar 2, 2012 at 6:13 AM, Humm, Markus <markus.h...@de.ebmpapst.com> 
wrote:


        Hello,
        
        thanks for your answer.
        
        While it is nice that you have concerns about my security in case I 
should have to deal with malicious servers,
        I would prefer to have a choice. Maybe some setting wich allows me, 
based on the server URL (or if that's too
        complicated for a start), to allow ../ in local externals paths or 
disallow this. With such a setting, SVN would
        seamlessly allow us to use our current directory layout while 
maintaining the benefits of atimic checkins.
        
        

Excuse me, but given the layout requirements you seek, can you get away with 
symlinks?

There are too many cases where non-root users have access to Subversion 
repositories for repositories that get run by, and manipulated by, the root 
user. The possibility of escalation attacks for *other* environments seems very 
large.

 

        A colleague of mine who uses a similiar directory layout and currently 
uses CVS and would have to switch when our
        SVN rollout happens now claimed that CVS supports this way of working 
(directory structure). If I'm not mistaken
        SVN uses the claim "CVS done right". So it should support this, as this 
is a legitimate directory structure
        And imposes no security problems in secure environments (eg. Our campus 
LAN with out local SVN server I administer).
        


Then write your own patch to disable the checks. For general deployment, I 
think it's begging for escalation attacks. 



        What do I need to do to get this feature? Where do I need to lobby for 
it?
        


I'm an old user, not a core developer, but this would seem to be a good place 
for general discussion  I can see the escalation attacks in a more general 
environment, myself: I see too many places in environments where I work that an 
*accidental* such use could cause endless havoc by pre-populating a system 
directory, such as, say, /etc/nagios.




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