Colin, I hope you'll reconsider this change and revert it.

I understand that there are buggy servers which fail when they get
offered too many ciphers by clients, but they *always* failed; that's
nothing new. So in order to expand the use cases for the library, this
change has caused a regression. It's much worse to take correctly-
working server/client pairs and deliberately break them than to fail to
support incorrectly-working server/client pairs.

It's not just us; Jordon Bedwell above had the same problem. It's going
to break a *lot* of people.

Moreover, it is really an important security issue as well as an
interoperability one. I have a right to expect that I will get the most
secure cipher from the set formed by the intersection of the client's
and the server's supported sets; with this change, I do not, because the
client has artificially eliminated some of its supported set.

This is a serious, serious regression, both in security and in
interoperability.

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/986147

Title:
  openssl 1.0.1-4ubuntu2 breaks a bunch of ciphers

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