Colin, I hope you'll reconsider this change and revert it. I understand that there are buggy servers which fail when they get offered too many ciphers by clients, but they *always* failed; that's nothing new. So in order to expand the use cases for the library, this change has caused a regression. It's much worse to take correctly- working server/client pairs and deliberately break them than to fail to support incorrectly-working server/client pairs.
It's not just us; Jordon Bedwell above had the same problem. It's going to break a *lot* of people. Moreover, it is really an important security issue as well as an interoperability one. I have a right to expect that I will get the most secure cipher from the set formed by the intersection of the client's and the server's supported sets; with this change, I do not, because the client has artificially eliminated some of its supported set. This is a serious, serious regression, both in security and in interoperability. -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/986147 Title: openssl 1.0.1-4ubuntu2 breaks a bunch of ciphers To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openssl/+bug/986147/+subscriptions -- ubuntu-bugs mailing list ubuntu-bugs@lists.ubuntu.com https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/ubuntu-bugs