This technique looks quite promising. I have a few questions though: 1. if I do the aa_query_label() check followed by an open() call to read it, am I open to the same race conditions as if I was relying on access() to check permissions?
2. if the given path is a symlink, am I checking for permission to read the symlink or the destination of the symlink, or both? If this lets us replace the FD passing hack, I'd love to use it. I'm just wondering how to safely use it in a race free manner. -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to apparmor in Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1381713 Title: Support policy query interface for file Status in AppArmor Linux application security framework: Triaged Status in Media Hub: New Status in Media Scanner v2: New Status in Thumbnail generator for all kinds of files: New Status in apparmor package in Ubuntu: Fix Released Bug description: This bug tracks the work needed to support querying if a label can access a file. This is particularly useful with trusted helpers where an application requests access to a file and the trusted helper does something with it. For example, on Ubuntu when an app wants to play a music file, it (eventually) goes through the media-hub service. The media-hub service should be able to query if the app's policy has access to the file. To manage notifications about this bug go to: https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+bug/1381713/+subscriptions -- Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~touch-packages Post to : [email protected] Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~touch-packages More help : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
