Hello Dariusz, or anyone else affected, Accepted ntp into bionic-proposed. The package will build now and be available at https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ntp/1:4.2.8p10+dfsg- 5ubuntu7.2 in a few hours, and then in the -proposed repository.
Please help us by testing this new package. See https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Testing/EnableProposed for documentation on how to enable and use -proposed. Your feedback will aid us getting this update out to other Ubuntu users. If this package fixes the bug for you, please add a comment to this bug, mentioning the version of the package you tested, what testing has been performed on the package and change the tag from verification-needed- bionic to verification-done-bionic. If it does not fix the bug for you, please add a comment stating that, and change the tag to verification- failed-bionic. In either case, without details of your testing we will not be able to proceed. Further information regarding the verification process can be found at https://wiki.ubuntu.com/QATeam/PerformingSRUVerification . Thank you in advance for helping! N.B. The updated package will be released to -updates after the bug(s) fixed by this package have been verified and the package has been in -proposed for a minimum of 7 days. ** Changed in: openssl (Ubuntu) Status: In Progress => Fix Released ** Changed in: ntp (Ubuntu Bionic) Status: New => Fix Committed ** Tags added: verification-needed verification-needed-bionic -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to ntp in Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1884265 Title: [fips] ntpq segfaults when attempting to use MD5 from FIPS-openssl library. Status in ntp package in Ubuntu: New Status in openssl package in Ubuntu: Fix Released Status in ntp source package in Bionic: Fix Committed Status in openssl source package in Bionic: In Progress Bug description: [Impact] In FIPS mode on Bionic MD5 is semi-disabled causing some applications to segfault. ntpq uses crypto hashes to authenticate its requests. By default it uses md5. However, when compiled with openssl it creates a lists of acceptable hashes from openssl that can be used. This issue is only applicable in bionic and when using fips-openssl. [Test Steps] Test case: sudo apt install ntp ntpq -p Segmentation fault (core dumped) What happens there is ntpq wants to iterate all available digests (list_digest_names in ntpq.c). It uses EVP_MD_do_all_sorted for this task. EVP_MD_do_all_sorted eventually runs openssl_add_all_digests_int in c_alld.c. For FIPS mode it adds: EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5()); What happens later in ntpq is (list_md_fn function inside ntpq.c): ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_get_digestbyname(name)); EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, digest, &digest_len); First digest it gets is MD5, but while running EVP_DigestInit for it, it gets to this point (openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c EVP_DigestInit_ex): #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode()) { if (!(type->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS) && !(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS); return 0; } } #endif Due to type->flags for MD5 being 0 there's an error set (EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS). After getting back to ntpq.c: ctx->engine and ctx->digest are not set (due to the mentioned error), hence inside EVP_DigestFinal_ex (openssl/crypto/evp/digest.c) OPENSSL_assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); causes a segfault (ctx->digest is NULL). So either MD5 shouldn't be added in FIPS mode or it should have the EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS to be properly initialized. [Regression Potential] I don't think this should regress ntpq + openssl from the Ubuntu archive. Current archive ntpq + openssl behaviour: openssl includes all message digests and hands ntpq a sorted digest-list. ntpq doesn't check return from EVP_Digest(Init|Final) and assumes all is well and sticks all digests into its list regardless if it is working or not. i.e. ntpq> help keytype function: set key type to use for authenticated requests, one of: MD4, MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA1, SHAKE128 If somehow openssl library is corrupted and sends back erroneous results, its possible the authentication will just not ever work. Newly fixed archive ntpq + oenssl beahviour: openssl includes all message digests and hands ntpq a sorted digest-list. ntpq checks each one and includes each working digest. With a non-corrupted openssl, everything works fine and ntpq includes each into its list. Ends up with a list identical to the one above. If somehow opensll library is corrupted and sends back erroneous results, ntpq will hopefully catch it by checking return code and include only those algos that appear to be working. Its possible authentication will work for ntpq. The difference will be seen in ntpq + fips-openssl. ntpq will check return, and for fips-not-approved algos, return will indicate an error. So these algos will be skipped and ntpq will not include into its digest list. Resulting in a much shorter list of only fips- approved algos. i.e. ntpq> help keytype function: set key type to use for authenticated requests, one of: SHA1, SHAKE128 Since md5 is ntpq's default auth algo, this will need to be changed to one of the above algos in the config files. But I think it is somewhat understood that MD5 is bad in a FIPS environment. 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