This was disclosed in the whitepaper referenced in
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-
events/blog/2016/june/abusing-privileged-and-unprivileged-linux-
containers/ (written by the reporter), so there's no need for this bug
report to stay private.

** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1549391

Title:
   /proc/sched_debug Information Leak

Status in lxc package in Ubuntu:
  New

Bug description:
  Description: Unprivileged containers can read from
  '/proc/sched_debug', a world-readable file within proc that contains a
  large amount of CFS and CPU scheduler information. This allows a
  trivial information leak which discloses what processes IDs and names
  are running in the host or other containers, as well as cgroup
  information which can disclose container names and other details. This
  effectively breaks the expected PID Namespace isolation.

  Reproduction: Inside a default and unprivileged LXC container, run the
  command `cat /proc/sched_debug`. Note that information is displayed
  about processes running on the host, as well as inside other
  containers.

  Sample output includes:
  task   PID         tree-key  switches  prio     exec-runtime sum-exec        
sum-sleep
  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        kthreadd     2 319429235.224770      9339   120 319429235.224770 
753.267075 1067018909.484918 0 /
       rcu_sched     7 319489137.064234  18896675   120 319489137.064234 
170125.420028 1066508074.968528 0 /
         rcuos/5    13 319218638.012762       192   120 319218638.012762 
0.896416 1065991450.159691 0 /
    .... SNIP ....                                               .... SNIP ....
           acpid  1813     57932.203222   1676704   120     57932.203222 
114395.580999 1067170248.528885 0 /autogroup-222
              sh  2273 113050772.150884        42   120 113050772.150884 
0.754525 1066111947.155906 0 /user/1000.user/c1.session
            bash  2276 113052316.082339       788   120 113052316.082339 
137.826052 1066155735.798643 0 /user/1000.user/c1.session
  wpa_supplicant  2319 113098971.410443    119765   120 113098971.410443 
6903.885769 1067229349.942336 0 /user/1000.user/c1.session
              sh  2426 113050772.151956        43   120 113050772.151956 
2.035147 1066012436.338286 0 /user/1000.user/c1.session
           urxvt  2440 113098872.794317    606323   120 113098872.794317 
28198.224898 1067122648.025421 0 /user/1000.user/c1.session
     dbus-daemon  2664 113092371.341763      6155   109 113092371.341763 
432.939147 1066723733.656385 0 /user/1000.user/c1.session
        dio/dm-2  2695     20657.783903         2   100     20657.783903 
0.007240         0.002253 0 /
  Chrome_FileThre  3286  31903985.081343    213744   120  31903985.081343 
14398.389541 1065335604.938435 0 /lxc/chrome

  Recommendation: In the short term, modify the base LXC AppArmor profile to
  block access to this file. In the long term, this procfs interface should be 
rewritten to be namespace aware and possibly restricted to root-only users. If 
AppArmor is not in use, end-users could recompile their kernel to have 
CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG disabled.

  #####

  About NCC:
  NCC Group is a security consulting company that performs all manner of
  security testing and has a strong desire to help make the industry a
  better, more resilient place. Because of this, when NCC Group
  identifies vulnerabilities in a system they prefer to work closely with
  vendors to create more secure systems. NCC Group strongly believes in
  responsible disclosure, and has strict guidelines in place to ensure
  that proper disclosure procedure is followed at all times. This serves
  the dual purpose of allowing the vendor to safely secure the product or
  system in question as well as allowing NCC Group to share cutting edge
  research or advisories with the security community.

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