podmo: > I'm going to rely on Intel not wanting to sabotage their own company but > still wish they would provide better documentation and while I'm at it, an > easily accessible jumper or BIOS switch to disable it. Meanwhile, I'll > focus on standard security practices such as OS hardening, network > firewalling, sandboxing, etc. I'm fully prepared to retract this if actual > evidence shows up but at this point all of these have a better ROI against > attackers than chasing shadows or worrying about FUD.
They won't deliberately add backdoor whatsoever. This is just a proprietary hypervisor: Roman Mamedov: > it's still a separate computer in your CPU, running proprietary > code, and having full read/write access to your RAM. It can mess with > your apps, OS and security in all sorts of interesting ways, and you > can NOT be absolutely certain that it doesn't. And it has bugs that can be exploited. Remotely. By anyone (there is no such a thing as NOBUS). If they're exploited then *ALL* your firewalls/sandboxes/whatever are meaningless. This won't seize to be a problem if you focus on other problems. Both should be solved. -- Ivan Markin -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
