On 27 September 2016 at 15:57, <blo...@openmailbox.org> wrote: > On 2016-09-27 09:45, Alec Muffett wrote: > Two questions: > > Is there a way that using an exit node for Gmail, FB, etc will not be > considered suspicious? Is that even possible? >
I feel that there's probably no silver bullet. In some ways this is exactly what Mirimir posted about above - I think there is much (much!) more to Tor than "Anonymity", but the architecture of TorBrowser in particular revolts against long-lived session session cookies and the other technologies which afford strong, trustable, long-term concepts of authenticated communication between a browser and a site. For more about this, the latter half of a video I did at a conference a couple of years ago may be interesting: https://video.adm.ntnu.no/pres/54b660049af94 Summary: authentication is not just binary "I Have A Session Cookie!" any more. Is it possible to use a different proxy way to access Gmail, FB, etc > without being seen as suspicious? For example, one could use proxychains > with Tor followed by a SOCKS proxy to login. > If I understand you right (?) I think that was exactly the reason we/Facebook set up the Onion site. A Tor-sympathetic access mechanism, more likely to be selected by human beings than folk pursuing the scraperfriendly adequate location-anonymity which exit nodes provide. > In both cases above (exit node and exit node plus SOCKS) we assume that > the IP address more or less matches the "normal" non-proxy login. I am in > Paris and use a Paris exit node and a Paris SOCKS proxy for example. > Check the video - it's not just "location". Remember, when working in a London office, employees of non-UK companies often ip-geolocate to being in (eg:) USA, FR, NL, or JP; this _really_ confuses organisations (eg: The BBC) who fee (or are) obligated to take geolocation overly seriously. > Finally, thanks for participating in this discussion. It is rare to have > people who work or used to work at the major webmail and social media > companies from a) getting involved and b) providing a nuanced (not > anti-Tor) perspective. You're welcome! It's nice to share! -a -- http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
