CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA <cannon <at> cannon-ciota.info> writes: > > Seeking technical information on how hidden services were de anonymized > and what updates to HS protocol was applied as a mitigation. > Thanks,
<speculation> If the attacker can take control of both the guard node of a hidden service and it's rendezvous point then they can do a traffic correlation attack to find the IP of the hidden service. If you're running a hidden service you can mitigate against this by choosing a relay you trust. Next generation hidden services are being worked on in Prop 224 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt) -- lukep -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk