Hi Seth, On 29-12-2015 11:05, Seth David Schoen wrote: > If you look at the original Tor design paper, they assume that someone > who is watching the place where a user enters the network (the first > node in the chain, today called entry guard) and the place where the > user's communications exit the network (the exit node) will be able to > break the user's anonymity by noticing that the amount and timing of data > going in on one side matches the amount and timing of data coming out on > the other side. This is pretty serious and has been used to deanonymize > people in real life.
Are there references for "real life" usage of traffic confirmation? Thanks -- Lucas Teixeira https://antivigilancia.org https://twitter.com/eletrorganico -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
