> NSA can't listen to traffic inside Russia and vice versa. You don't know that it all. Either country could have taps inside the backbone infrastructure of the other, or control parts of the Tor network used by people in the other country. You shouldn't mislead people with claims that neither be proven nor reasonably argued.
On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 10:41 AM, aka <akademik...@googlemail.com> wrote: > NSA can't listen to traffic inside Russia and vice versa. Both attackers > want to redirect traffic to their nodes or nodes inside their > wiretapping abilities. > > Ivan Markin wrote: > > aka: > >> To correlate Tor traffic you need to control a majority of nodes. If > >> both Russia and NSA try to control them, both fail. > > > > To correlate Tor traffic you do not need to control any node. What you > > need is to control traffic that runs between these nodes and clients > > (links). In case of this passive attack no attacker "fails". > > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
