-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 s7r requested I post the second round of log breakdowns, here it is:
HTTP Code: 200 (OK) Bandwidth used (bytes): 1,457,612,885,805 Hits: 10,116,575 HTTP Code: 206 (Partial Content RFC 7233) Bandwidth used (bytes): 5,751,202 Hits: 73 HTTP Code: 304 (Not Modified) Bandwidth used (bytes): 124,620 Hits: 620 HTTP Code: 404 (Not Found) Bandwidth used (bytes): 285,185 Hits: 657 HTTP Code: 403 (Forbidden) Bandwidth used (bytes): 2,908 Hits: 7 HTTP Code: 408 (Request Timeout) Bandwidth used (bytes): 0 Hits: 11,205 Total bandwidth usage (bytes): 1,457,619,049,720 (1.457 TB) Total hits: 10,129,137 The above figures do not match s7r's total due to the first set of log files not being in the downloads, but it isn't a huge difference and is in proportion to the previous results. T On 13/07/2015 23:54, s7r wrote: > Hello, > > Here are the latest counts for the OnionBalace hidden service > http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/ : > > Failback instance #1: 2329348 Failback instance #2: 1822384 > Failback instance #3: 2025677 Failback instance #4: 2109677 > Failback instance #5: 2202052 ================================ > *TOTAL: 10489138* > > Uptime is ~2 weeks. We have passed the 10 million threshold, not > bad, especially for a ~2 week period of time. Logs are here: > https://www.sky-ip.org/onionbalance/ > > Each failback instance had 2 introduction points in the master > descriptor. > > Thanks to everyone who contributed in this! Please stop the > automated scripts which connect to this hidden service now. I am > temporarily shutting it down for 1 or 2 days, in order to install a > script which will collect rendezvous circuit statistics on each > failback instance. We need this info since we can't say how many > clients or circuits made the 10 million successful hits from > above. > > In the next part of the test we will make sure we use a separate > rendezvous circuit for each request, using a modified third party > script with -tor-auto-isolate. This is extremely high load on the > network and it's VERY RUDE to do it in the wild with Guards (also > responsible for other users traffic). For this reason, I have > asked TheCthulhu for a high end server where I've setup a > non-public bridge to be used for this. This way, at least we won't > be hammering on Guards. I want to run it for shorter period of time > (max. 72 hours), but at 'full speed'. > > Who is interested and able to help, please email me directly and > I'll provide the necessary tools and info. > > Results and logs will be made public immediately after. I want to > see how many different rendezvous circuits can be created with a > hidden service (failback instance) if it has only 2 introduction > points in the master descriptor and how many such circuits will > each server take. It might be helpful for deciding related to prop > 224 (next generation hidden services) - merging HSDirs and IPs - > how many of them should a hidden service have by default. > > > On 7/8/2015 5:07 PM, Thomas White wrote: >> Just to expand on s7r's number, I just pulled the latest logs >> from the servers and compiled a quick breakdown of the HTTP >> codes, bandwidth etc for anyone interested: > >> HTTP Code: 200 (OK) Bandwidth used (bytes): 690,400,220,422 >> Hits: 4,784,288 > > >> HTTP Code: 206 (Partial Content) Bandwidth used (bytes): >> 5,202,918 Hits: 64 > > >> HTTP Code: 304 (Not Modified) Bandwidth used (bytes): 52,059 >> Hits: 259 > > >> HTTP Code: 404 (Not Found) Bandwidth used (bytes): 266,053 Hits: >> 611 > > >> HTTP Code: 403 (Forbidden) Bandwidth used (bytes): 2,908 Hits: 7 > > >> HTTP Code: 408 (Request Timeout) Bandwidth used (bytes): 0 Hits: >> 5,442 > > >> Total bandwidth usage (bytes): 690,405,744,360 (690 GB) > >> Total hits: 4,790,671 > > >> Not bad for a few days work guys! > >> T > > > > >> On 08/07/2015 03:00, s7r wrote: >>> *Numbers look good: Over 4 million hits in 7 days.* > >>> I want again to use this opportunity to say THANK YOU to >>> everyone who is contributing and stress testing. 4 million >>> requests tell me people are putting quite some effort into it. >>> Please continue to stress test as much as you can in the next >>> days. After I collect some rendezvous circuit stats also, we >>> will stop the test - don't want to overkill the network, prefer >>> to leave more bandwidth capacity for users. > >>> I was waiting to have some rendezvous circuit statistics as >>> well, to compare them with the hits on the webserver and have >>> an overview on the circuits stats and average number of >>> requests per circuit. Hopefully this will happen in the next >>> days. Since you asked, here are the exact numbers now. > >>> The service was started 1st July 2015. Here are the counts >>> today, 8th July (little over 7 days of uptime): > >>> Failback instance #1: 956281 Failback instance #2: 732187 >>> Failback instance #3: 837818 Failback instance #4: 768636 >>> Failback instance #5: 911546 ============================= >>> TOTAL: 4206468 > >>> There are no significant warnings or errors - the same >>> instances are running since service first started, no reboot >>> or application restart. I am happy with how it works. As you >>> can see we have *over 4 million hits*. The number of requests >>> per failback instance confirms the load is fairly spread. > >>> Hidden service http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/ up and strong! > >>> On 7/8/2015 1:48 AM, tqr2813d376cjozqa...@tutanota.com wrote: >>>> 4. Jul 2015 22:57 by s...@sky-ip.org <mailto:s...@sky-ip.org>: > >>>> After little over 3 days of uptime, the OnionBalance hidden >>>> service http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion >>>> <http://eujuuws2nacz4xw4.onion/> was successfully accessed >>>> over 1 Million times. There was no complaint in any of the >>>> running Tor instance s. > > > >>>> Hey s7r, things still looking OK? How are the numbers now? > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJVpF9VAAoJEIC+hZxcLl/kaX8P/3OkVbSgyga400cWysY6EyCB 9OTlPQGSNvGYzDL9iDqmLEECmETbjZl1BP8Wk8eL1SAa9967u5RI5CCsj/N0DbZo SV0/jz2TH1m4y526JwDKZ4ns++bfj+cwzejccfThVDyGHo+Hv1kYC7533sU2JN9d iDNP2U4G4y4qz2cdqIq7HArPZo5y2ChnDs8OeTHRofYK15toEE8/zUeS+tBTVQPa +8Nkmpm39yMIfjaoQ2hA2emjSJaPLE9U/IXhhuZaQwzj8J8cueDR9jfpcUnfjc+J QgtIIrT/IKj+0J7xZ0G8HNfGYW182GYe8QT92E0xpbtPk9n3gUJxypRWFklSfRvP HtaM2gyeJ/5A90zNMO+aJzkDxM56XieNg6s7mRNpLOyOMVnzgoSrkp8rp0D2voNt BAfgqSeGa5LkyHIPYR7vAVyb9aODyN0mj+HNPNeJT1i77sd2yY0hf4SrohjRoNak /AuHbDl+2qn6nLoZcU8w+YxhGt58sQSBwvLxVvVtbNBaHobT76WcziOLilmQ8xKj kmHC39KIY2tEQ5xFRO0s+UEWWHR3+myi294hgP3Zxeb6JdEcis73Qh/pkJp2RJE9 X0rIo/gTob0vqO1vdkFMI98X9knZ3g22quojJyoe5kcqxWZcXH9JsvhKQ3ykkO5f xconPe9kVlgqnaxrypNB =sFsI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
