-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 > This makes for an interesting counter-example: if the MyFamily > declaration was used as reason for setting BadExit on related > exits, a malicious adversary could set their MyFamily to the same > as a good exit cluster, and then intentionally behave badly, in > order to get the good cluster flagged as BadExit. > > My point is, the MyFamily declaration is completely > unauthenticated, and cannot be relied upon for anything more than > providing contact information. There is a newer iteration being > discussed that would prevent relays from joining families without > permission, but then a malicious exit provider would have even less > motivation to set it up.
Since MyFamily declarations have to be mutual to actually build a Family group, your described attack scenario does not work. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVPQsBAAoJEFv7XvVCELh0vqMP+wQZMKcUT1glEMNZ9cjnFHYJ Xe88I8SBfLUm3+cRIMaxDkA+92X7UqDbB30tL65WsDOq4IQVHeVqT9NeR/b4aPAP Yabb2SBsiOIqYW1V4E92OdxiW7oUHeG7hGd1BCis8AE7dY/D8UQ5etvQEqKw3oTE wQHtcCO6kLDbACGe8l0cUmJNL1Qb4dHEfupP11wCdics9PW7HAF6xvW8jgaOT5bK aVjmMuKCIGwIOU/9gPgLVY+bqX+ORnR12iGUlpsWJrkXEumG+ZMW8H2Jn7p43ALc 7Syf+pLNN0HeG8PrbXR3opmY9TPnw+0W0SKsHskbH1aAxzxNrXuw2YXb4yyg8grf bnwOtcYGVNiShHMGOx9cvncnLfSXBZs9FqAaZVKRzhPUlK5tbvtBHh2aLXu6TlJC hiQgPQOjUHRwbEeCL0RO3KTIlHaoMZbjEO2kWbFDh4bgWdFJglCv57FVVplIIjq0 3ogP719jN1NNyebX8CJ6OIyWH+id9y6ghARmnvHcRGu3c3f+G2OtokpwKiC/pm07 +jx6IeHh7get/L+Qh7tXDnKrrAU4YwCoSO50BOmgtf7Gxt2NIBX2A8L/z70BNOiK WpM0bbmQUiNJKmE2skS8REEQ+rQiOv3rh/Fu8Qo09gZngZH1FHHd8rwclJEkNy8e wlUP/tWDLHrrevcMdrB/ =rJDh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
