grarpamp <grarp...@gmail.com> writes: > On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 12:16 PM, George Kadianakis <desnac...@riseup.net> > wrote: >> I find their concern very valid > > Respectfully... invalid. Onions are going to be mined, shared, leaked, > indexed, and copied anyways. And most certainly by your adversaries. > Do we forget merely publishing an onion to the dirs results in accesses. > Lists of onions just make all this abundantly and properly obvious for > those who don't get the picture. Nor are you going to be able to
I understand but don't really agree with your point. Mainly because I can't think of a single positive thing that can happen because of this public list. > influence or censor every list. So instead of whining they should be > doing something to enforce actual privacy... > 1) HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient > 2) HTTPS/app level auth FWIW, none of the above will actually help against a non-experienced user that uses tor2web to connect to an onion by mistake. Even with HS authorization or HTTP auth, the onion will forever be imprinted on that public list. > 3) OpSec > 4) Site defense > 5) etc OpSec would help, but it actually relies on the human factor. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
