"krishna e bera" wrote: >They are tapping the cables and getting ip addresses of browsers, then >sharing that with other "intelligence" agencies. E.g. you could be >stopped at the border if someone in your house clicked on a monitored site. >Another reason to use Tor (not an uppercased acronym) all the time.
In the view of such intelligence agencies using Tor might make you an extremist. It's more than enough reason for them to pay attention and arguably as much as directly accessing any monitored site. If they tap the cables, and consult shared intelligence, what are the chances that using Tor will stop them. It's must be an inside joke at NSA to say Tor is one of the technologies that they've not broken. A clever misdirection to maintain face globally. They (probably) won't be able to deanonymize all Tor clients at a moment in time. Neither will they admit how many they can at a moment in time. An anonymous network used only by intelligence agencies is useless to them. We live in an era where 2million to create a hash collision, and still be considered relatively secure, is chump change for countries that can hide behind economic powerhouses. There's a wealth of information that can be derived from the data you make public. Threats aren't classified by access to monitored sites--they're derived from all the data that can be gathered about you. Have you ever read "Finding Paul Revere"? [1] Chances are (100%) if you use Tor and have a private online presence (or lack thereof) you've got a great big bulls-eye on you. All you can do is make their job as hard as possible with as little gain. Wear them down. Make them beg for every scrap. Make sure they know it too. -- leeroy [1] http://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2013/06/09/using-metadata-to-find-paul-revere/ -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
