Oh wait, unless, did you mean same ip? So you'll have clients using your bridge while you make connections to a guard. Current Tor implements guard rotation mitigation. Observe directory connection during bootstrap and associate timing with your initially chosen guards. If clients later connect to you as bridge it would be possible to differentiate your traffic from incoming clients by timing and looking at next-hop.
You might be able to take advantage of such a situation if were willing to accept the consequence for more frequent guard rotation Which is to say not using guards at all or change them over short intervals to mimic the choice of a middle node for a client. If you have 1000 clients using your bridge I can see how it would be harder to correlate their incoming connection vs. failed/successful middle-hop with your outgoing connection to entry node. -- leeroy -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
