Updateable list: one single party has keys to make Tor work or not work Hardcoded list: lots of repos of different OS are responsible for their users' Tor to work
Jim wrote: > Thomas White wrote: >> Generally some criteria for DirAuths are people who are trusted by the >> community, aren't raided very often/have legal troubles/could be >> legally compromised, people with an extensive understanding of how Tor >> works and people who can secure their systems from attacks. Remember >> every time a dirauth is added or change IP a new tor version must be >> released as they are hardcoded so it isn't a simple process to add a >> new one, not to mention intra-dirauth communication and verification. > > I don't know about the intra-dirauth communication, but as far as the > directory authorities being hard coded, would it make sense to put them > in a small configuration file instead? If for some reason it is deemed > undesirable to allow users to alter that file, there could be a > requirement the file be signed with one or more private keys and have > the corresponding public keys hardcoded into the code. It would be much > easier and cheaper to distribute a new, small, signed configuration file > than to release and distribute a whole new version of tor. > > Jim > > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
