>> If all users use Tor only for sensitive communications, then state >> level adversaries can round up all users of Tor and the provided >> anonymity is of little use. > > That's true. But there is a sense in which Tor should be used > selectively: It's counterproductive to use Tor when identity and > geolocation are desired and/or essential. If my bank, for example, sees > Tor IPs, it might freeze my account. And that's a _good_ thing.
I disagree. I'd rather have more people using Tor even for things where identity is an essential part of authenticating you, like a bank. I'd rather see the bank move to other methods. If we can obsolete automatic location based identification I think that is a good thing. You should be able to share your location with your banks website, but it should not automatically be able to gather it. > That's why anonabox is so dangerous, even if there were no security > holes. Guaranteed hardware-based Tor connectivity is great, for those > who know where, when and how to use it. But providing that to users who > don't understand the situation is dangerous. And doing it via WiFi, > which is virtually unsecurable, is even worse. This I can agree with. >> Cat photos and Amazon shopping by non-subversives gives vulnerable >> users cover and is fundimental to the usefulness of Tor. > > Cat photos, yes :) But Amazon shopping, maybe not so much. Why wouldn't Amazon shopping provide Tor users with cover? >> Should entities encouraging heavy routine use of Tor contribute >> relays? Absolutely. > > Well, I gather that there's currently a surplus of non-exit relays and > bandwidth. So specifically they should contribute exit relays. That's > not so easy, however, and there's far too little support for it from the > Tor Project, in my (albeit limited) experience. This is definitely a problem that I would love to see worked on some. Thank you, Derric Atzrott -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
