On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 08:48:35AM -0800, coderman wrote: > Griffin, Matt, Adam, Roger, David, George, Karen, and Jake worked on a > wonderful write up of all the questions and concerns regarding this > Op: > > https://blog.torproject.org/blog/thoughts-and-concerns-about-operation-onymous >
Thanks for sending this! For those who read this earlier, two new paragraphs were added: Under "Attacks on the Tor network": *Similarly, there exists the attack where the hidden service selects the attacker's relay as its guard node. This may happen randomly or this could occur if the hidden service selects another relay as its guard and the attacker renders that node unusable, by a denial of service attack[0] or similar. The hidden service will then be forced to select a new guard. Eventually, the hidden service will select the attacker. And under "Advice to concerned hidden service operators" *Another possible suggestion we can provide is manually selecting the guard node of a hidden service. By configuring the EntryNodes option in Tor's configuration file you can select a relay in the Tor network you trust. Keep in mind, however, that a determined attacker will still be able to determine this relay is your guard and all other attacks still apply. * Added information about guard node DoS and EntryNodes option - 2014/11/09 18:16 UTC > > > also, > the performance link to doc/TUNING shows it could use much help. > currently this is minimal, focused on file descriptor limits. more > tuning guidance is needed! Yes please! > > there is a good thread a few years past on tor-relays, > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2010-August/000164.html > , which could provide instruction for additional knobs to turn for a > solid relay or client under load. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
