-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 As long as the current guard model is in place then the relay could probably tell if its a client vs bridge by the frequency of visit. I'm assuming that a client visits one of its guard more often on average then a random bridge would connect to that guard. There is probably something in the code that tells the node which spot they are in.
The network would be slightly less secure because the chances of having the first and last node would be improved, making correlation attacks easier. It would how ever not be a third easier though, because of Guards and exits wouldn't be used (much) as a middle node. On 08/31/2014 05:00 AM, tor-talk-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote: > Let's imagine the Tor network is choosing 2 or 3 nodes, the first > node would not be able to know it is the first one (because it does > not know if the path is 2 or 3 nodes), it could check that the IPs > are not belonging to the Tor network and then find out that it is > the first one, but these IPs could be secret bridges, so it might > not be really sure it is the first one. > > But maybe the benefit of such proposal (if proven safe) would be > too small in the context of the Tor network compared to the > traditionnal three nodes selection. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJUA4t2AAoJEDsKeXBBl7wEbYIQAMzbTiH3MTI/mDOUNqaFB/vB GA0vKDPhbEt/NRwum8ZPUmjTnWwCFeHqWQEwt9SVztEH1xeJ+Gs2xfYK/V83AzPo dkkf75Okj4aH6w+xJWvlXx2BnopraE4tyTx1PPnyiryffxsDPFU0EfA/ljLtudv2 NnKKuZjSWXrS+aMLjbKTD+cPNywwL3nlYBUdOaeKoUe84kWS2jX7Hw3X+GzcOQWd ITgmarqj4/ctJkktXdW+M9sLr6UzVNCCgx34vV+wkrEeNnzT/unfO9CRqwNR+BdS kgqWwrPnoIQgHbp5WwjGY0GcXEYcHRQzBAI40zyIBQXRwrZ2zbYthf5ygJxKN0HE 7pJ/676pHmf3ZeKZV28g9whPl6l3r4MAlyq6lLmP/RDbCaVieQQIZXYtzd7soGIZ +yKVN+eXsJvusgF5u6mucKV7gmmKrVco9kIGW9HHjY0GDsENTJi5KrSl97Ws2Tzn FQfMkOjncazTli/7Gm1r9Evw2ItzYiUCUbbzpCSb4c5iRvoSzSMJqmBv9M+I7EuJ 8oJAUf6v3Iq4FTeeq1Dm53ACFBWdywW09cz5o4HBGmLc83SxjWCPA/IOdvZZRjGj eAY6jlgAPRovjMHiOISVOERDZeLITV011OJzVdlESqw8UkkfkyogfWrKEOVPM1hh cl4XEYYwV7jYBCTYcNTn =ji+6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
