On 07/31/2014 05:52 AM, CJ wrote: > > Heya! Just jumping in there in order to point a post on tor-dev ML: > > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-July/007258.html > > > this approach may be really interesting, I think it deserve an > answer :). It bypasses the centralized "pressionable" entity, > keeps anonymity and so on. > > Cheers, > > C. >
Hi, I'm a developer of Namecoin. We actually have DNS for .onion addresses already working, although the implementation is pretty rough and should only be considered a proof of concept. Right now it's in the form of a Firefox extension, but a XULRunner-based standalone proxy application is close to release. There's a little bit of info at http://bit.namecoin.info/ , but we haven't done a great job of documenting the .onion support yet... I can answer questions. One potential issue is that Namecoin (and most Bitcoin-based currencies) aren't anonymous due to blockchain graph analysis; the best that can be obtained right now is pseudonymity. This is still useful, since it gives you location anonymity, so you can hide the true location+IP of your .onion server and/or your Namecoin node. We're interested in implementing the Zerocash proposal by Miers/Garman/et.al. once its code is released, which would give much better anonymity. I'm not sure why the author of the proposal linked above thinks that we need Tor relays to be trusted... the Namecoin developers are actively looking at solutions such as SPV+UTXO, which has much better trust properties than trusting a quorum of 3 random relays, and doesn't use much storage or bandwidth. Any questions, feel free to ask -- we're more than interested in working with the Tor community to make DNS for .onion usable. Cheers, -Jeremy Rand -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
