On 07/25/2014 11:31 PM, grarpamp wrote: <SNIP>
> Do we underestimate the social net in oppressed that gives > them awareness of tor, and to obtain binary and share bridge > info in the first place? Maybe we do. But what about carelessness, poor judgment and the prevalence of informers? Wouldn't it be better to have a system that protected bridges by design? > Or that oppressor will not burn $cheap govt SIM and IP army > to get and block bridges from gmail to @getbridges? Right. Requiring hard-to-get email addresses does make it harder to get bridge IPs. But who does that impact the most, potential users or adversaries? Is there relevant evidence? > This is difficult. Indeed. Please excuse the repetition, but DNS-based fast flux (Proximax) with selection-based dropping of domain names associated with bridge blocking is the best possibility that I've seen. Rather than trying to prevent adversaries from joining the system, it recursively isolates based on behavior. <SNIP> -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
