On 6/28/14, Mirimir <miri...@riseup.net> wrote: > On 06/28/2014 01:31 AM, grarpamp wrote: >> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 5:32 PM, coderman <coder...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 11:38 AM, Juan <juan....@gmail.com> wrote: >>> traffic correlation is trivial if you can watch traffic in and >>> out of the network. >>>> ... Tor, by design, is useless against >>>> governments that can do traffic analysis. For instance, the US >>>> government. >>> >>> last but not least, passive confirmation attacks are passe; the best >>> attacks active. >>> >>> "From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types" >>> http://freehaven.net/doc/batching-taxonomy/taxonomy.pdf >> >> Pending a second read of such papers... I still think a network >> that uses fixed external packet sizes and fills internode links >> with chaff versions of same to meet some fixed clock rate... >> would be more resistant to this. Afaik no network has tried >> this yet. > > What do you think of the anonymity network (Dissent) described in this > working draft from Joan Feigenbaum and Bryan Ford?[1] > > [1] http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5307
"Looks" awesome! Just finished reading it. I am not a cryptographer. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
