On 1/29/2014 7:08 PM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
> Playing devil's advocate - is it a good or not so good idea for users
> 1) not to be able to see their current (exit) node? For Tor users in
> certain countries, would it be the best choice to use nodes located in
> their own countries or in ones suspected of being "cooperative" with
> their countries? Or nodes in specific other countries, depending on
> your country & its working relationship with those other countries?
>
> Or is using exit nodes in your own country or in countries that
> regularly trade info with your country (many countries do), not
> considered an issue - at all?
>
> 2) not to know the result of a new identity? Given 1) - (can't see
> nodes)..., then 2) seems a moot point.
You can use the ExcludeExitNodes directive if you want to avoid exits in
certain countries. I would assume that using exit nodes in your own
country/close partners is generally a bad idea if your government is
your adversary. It seems like this would be the easiest case for them
to do traffic correlation. On other hand, nothing stops them from
running exit nodes in other countries, so simply avoiding exits in your
own country/partner countries may not be very effective at all.
You know what might be a cool idea (but probably a large undertaking,
unfortunately):
* On first boot, TBB questions you about your goals/adversary model.
* Bypassing local firewall/censorship
* Bypassing state-level firewall/censorship
* Avoiding monitoring by ISP
* Avoiding monitoring by government
* etc, etc...
* TBB configures torrc appropriately to balance performance/privacy vs.
your specific adversary. This could include requesting/selecting
bridges or excluding certain exit nodes, etc.
I know, Tor devs are busy already... It just seemed like a neat idea.
Someday I'll take the time to really learn C so I can do more for the
project beyond running a relay and spreading the good word.
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