t...@bitmessage.ch: > I appreciate your perspective but still think the community may still be > better off--including those who take the time to RTFM--by taking a harm > reduction approach to the RTFM-related problems you've mentioned.
the fundamental problem here is that this is not a technological issue. it's a user issue that will, in the end, breakdown at the "rtfm" point. currently, the tor browser bundle has a link on the opening page which documents the standard tips on remaining anonymous. outside of writing more detailed instructions on identity correlation and linking them in the basic instructions, there isn't much more that can be done outside of discovering a technological means that makes connecting to the tor network itself invisible. > We may not feel sympathetic to this user's situation because of the > circumstances, but I hoped to point out that something similar could > plausibly happen to some *other* person using Tor for good that we > probably wouldn't want to experience the Syrian equivalent or the Chinese > equivalent of the consequences this person now faces. the more you look at the circumstances involved, the less likely that is. the man who made the threat was using tor for offensive, rather than defensive, purposes. additionally, he was engaging in an offensive operation against an entity that he was personally connected to. for people looking to circumvent censorship, it is unlikely that they will be viewing any servers run by their respective oppressors while using the tor network. rather, they'll most likely be communicating with servers that are not run by their respective oppressors and, instead, are blocked by them. completely different scenarios. > Framing user education as an > important problem to solve or mitigate where possible seems like a more > constructive approach to me. Maybe we can't prevent all users from making > unwise choices, but to the extent we can help more of them, I still think > we should try. https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#AttacksOnOnionRouting it's there. maybe the harvard student would have been smart enough to figure out what it meant. maybe he wouldn't. or, like so many others, maybe he would have decided to role the dice anyways under the assumption that capture was unlikely. without the tor project documenting every possible way someone may get caught through their various uses of tor, i'm hard pressed to think of a solution to te problem posed by ignorant users. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
