>> HS -> Guard -> Middle -> Middle -> Rendpoint <- Middle <- Guard <- Client
> I hate to say it that gives me no confidence at all. Only the randomly > chosen guard at the HS end needs to be compromised and the whole chain > becomes worthless. A timing attack will reveal all. I'd thought it trivial to time/packet/byte count and find the: - HS, IF you ran both its guard and a client. - Client, IF you ran both its guard and its destination of choice (HS/[clearnet/exit]). It depends on whether the guard has knowledge that some of the streams going through its relay function are in fact destined for a HS/client and not some other relay. I never properly followed up on that question... -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
