Hi Anthony. If the first-in-line server gets compromised then the users using this HiddenService have to cross fingers that their privoxy or similar anonymizer is well configured.
Because the first server-in-line is the tor node handling the public HiddenService declaration and the Tor network as transport network imho needs to stay transparent, there is nothing I can imagine that can be done apart of intergration of request modification into the HiddenService declaration so this personal informations would never leave the Tor network. But also the actual approach should be capable of injecting a warning into the response when personal information is found in the request.Something like injecting a div-layer with a warning after the body tag when a accept-language tag is found other than 'en'. Expecially when the installed server only supports 'en' why sending anything else that changes nothing.Or instead the response can be only a warning and no content from the HiddenService. But this would force the users to setup a special configuration... something I wouldn't like. But I think the relay isn't the primary target in first place for the authorities so risk is acceptable. And if one in the chain gets compromised the other will know. A (manual human executed) protocol of changing the X-OnionRelay-Auth code for example would prevent that users get through to the server even if the proxy will forward the request. This would be well paranoid but still the request leaves the Tor network unfiltered and unencrypted. Greetings, Manfred Am 30.10.2013 14:26 schrieb "Anthony Papillion" <anth...@papillion.me>: > On 10/29/2013 08:48 AM, Manfred Ackermann wrote: > > Hi List. > > > > Sorry to push this up, just wondering if this approach is such stupid > that > > it's not even worth leaving a related comment to it ;-) Or is it just of > no > > interest? > > > > Any comments apriciated. > > Hello Manfred, > > Sounds like a fantastic idea. But I think I'm missing something that I'm > hoping you can clear me up on. How does this protect the user if the > first-in-line server is compromised? So the user connects to HS on > computer1 which is compromised. How does your system stop them from > being compromised instead of forwarded deeper into the network to > computer2? > > Cheers, > Anthony > > > -- > Anthony Papillion > XMPP/Jabber: cajuntec...@jit.si > OTR Fingerprint: 1515393D53BA593C19E2CD549AE59FB650F82ABC > SIP: 17772471...@callcentric.com > PGP Key: 0xDC89FF2E > > -- > tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > To unsubscribe or change other settings go to > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
