In principle this is (as they write) very similar to earlier papers. The
major catch to their plan may be that if a hidden service already has
chosen its entry guards, and the "modified Tor nodes" are put out there
later - they ("malicious nodes") will therefore not be a part of the
path. But if they already have trusted entry nodes out there and the
client/hidden service selects by default Tor method - their attack (and
earlier ones) should be quite realistic.Meaning that a hidden service should be very careful of which nodes it selects as the entry node(s). Maybe Tor should *not* allow new entry nodes (by default) to be added for hidden services upon unavailability of old entry nodes because of this? Another option may be separation of not trusting/adding new entry nodes for hidden services, but still do so for the Tor client? (There is (was?) an option for StrictEntryNodes in torrc which should be considered, but I seriously hope critical sites are not hosted without deep knowledge of how the hidden services are vulnerable.) Be safe! - Lasse On 19. okt. 2012 05:12, Lee Whitney wrote: > I was reading a paper on discovering hidden service locations, and couldn't > find any reason it shouldn't work in principle. > > However being that I'm a Tor novice, I wanted ask here. > > In a nutshell they propose throwing some modified Tor nodes out there that > modify the protocol enough to track down the location. It does take some > time, but it doesn't seem like years. > > Any comment appreciated, here's a link to the paper: > > http://www.cs.uml.edu/~xinwenfu/paper/HiddenServer.pdf > > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
