On 9/19/2012 6:18 PM, Anthony Papillion wrote: > It's widely believed that an attacker with a sufficiently wide view of the > Internet could unmask and identify Tor users. For example, if 3195 bytes go > into a specific entry node and 3195 bytes come out of an exit node a few > seconds later, chances are pretty good it's you. > > I'm wondering if there are any ongoing efforts to get around this issue? > > Thanks, > Anthony > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk@lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > I think that I remember reading somewhere that all packets come in only one size so an interloper would have the task of counting packets and then trying to match to other data streams with the same number of packets in some time window. Since the encryption would be different on the other stream it is still not very easy. Maybe Tor randomly throws in some extra packets now and then to make life more interesting.
David C
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