On Mon, Feb 06, 2012 at 07:24:31PM +0000, Mr Dash Four wrote: > Initially, there was a small number of these in the wild, but now it > is widely spread - google is the main offender, but youtube (which > is, as we all know, google-owned) and now, wait for it, scroogle.org > (a site I use a lot) is also at it!
Google doesn't specifically single out exit relays. Google pops up a captcha when a given IP address has asked it too many questions recently. It's a defense mechanism against crawlers from, say, Bing who are trying to steal their precious secret sauce. https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#GoogleCaptcha > Tor-blocking could be very easily to implement by parsing > cached-descriptors{.new} to see all exit nodes and then add them to > a blacklist and start blocking. Is there anything which can be done > to prevent this? > > I am thinking of something similar to what is currently in existence > with the bridge system - you don't know them all, just a portion of > it, enough to connect you to the network. Could something similar be > implemented with tor? You may like https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#HideExits In theory the Tor protocol supports an "exit bridge" concept: the Tor design separates the relaying component (how to establish a circuit given a set of relays) from the discovery component (how to learn what relays to use), so you could just bolt on another discovery mechanism. But nobody has designed or implemented one. --Roger _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
