Hi hmoh,

On Dec 23, 2011, at 3:23 PM, h...@safe-mail.net wrote:
> Tor and all stuff is Open Source and many people looking inside for security 
> review. A very weak link is that most users use the precompiled ready to use 
> binaries. But it is not possible to be sure that binaries are build from an 
> unaltered source code. The precompiled binaries may include back doors. Also 
> that most users download from torproject.org is an other single point of 
> failure as just one instance has to be forced to include a back door.
> 
> I've never read that someone checks frequently that the source code is 100% 
> same like the binaries.
> Compiling everything oneself is a lot of hassle, most users do not do that as 
> it's a big inconvenience.
> 
> I am not here to offend someone. There are a lot reasons in the nature of 
> this project to ask such questions. The whole Tor project is about distrust 
> and fear of getting traced and logged. Even if I'd knew all involved persons 
> in person and I'd trust them I wouldn't trust the binaries 100%.
> 
> The machines who build the binaries could be compromised including a backdoor 
> on compile time. People with lots of money, government or wealthy companies 
> could thread and force you or your families to include a backdoor into Tor.
> 
> To protect you and the Tor users I propose the following....
> 
> Additionally to the precompiled binaries you could offer a 1-click-compile 
> version. It could be an script which downloads all the needed stuff for 
> compiling and building the executable.
> 
> This isn't a bottomless pit. Don't try to make the second step before the 
> first one. For example on Windows the script would download the precompiled 
> executables of mingw, msys, msysDTK and so on from sf.net, download source 
> code of Tor from torproject.org, compiling and so on... Yes, it would be 
> again a risk to download the precompiled executables as those could be 
> possibly forced to have included a backdoor as well.
> 
> The idea of 1-click-compile-versions has to develop over time. No one can 
> expect the concept to be perfect from the beginning. The tor project would 
> start with it and later over time all the decencies would hopefully also 
> allow similar 1-click-compile-versions. All this until a point where we can 
> compile the whole operating system, the browser and Tor with one click.
> 
> If that's half running I can imagine a distributed community / program to 
> review the updated source codes. After downloading new source the program 
> would check it from different sources if it's the same some independent 
> people had stated there opinion about the changes. This would allow all users 
> to download, compile and start executables from source at the same time 
> having some feedback from external developers about the quality of the source 
> code they're using.
> 
> Don't tell it's impossible. Tell what are the weak points of this concept are 
> and propose enhancements.

Don't be so defensive ;) We agree with almost everything here, but there
are some limitations. By default, even if you build the same code twice
on the exact same *system*, you will get two different binaries. We
consider this a problem, and and in fact have a ticket open in our
bugtracker about doing just that for the linux and os x platform [0].

We have some Makefiles around that can be easily used to bootstrap a
build, and we encourage people to try it out and report problems they
find.

On Windows, the problem seems entirely unsolvable, see the
above-mentioned ticket.

All the best
Sebastian

[0]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3688
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