> Right now we're exploring latency-based attacks but are having trouble > achieving a particular goal: a way to “ping” an arbitrary node in a > client’s already-built (“live”) circuit. One-way timing is ideal but round > trip time would suffice. We can glean this information during circuit > construction, but what about a “live” circuit? Ideally, this would be a > periodic thing Tor already keeps track of, but as an on-demand or as a > byproduct/side-effect of a different function would also work. We have not > been able to find a way to do this within the Tor (sub)protocol specs or > the control port spec.
Use OnionCat and ping6, it is exactly what you want. https://www.onioncat.org/ Such "timing" attacks are in the scope of "Tor Stinks -- NSA" document. Users should become familiar with them, and that slide deck, and other attacks from over a decade ago. And with how tor does not address them. _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
