> On 25 Apr 2018, at 18:30, Mike Perry <mikepe...@torproject.org> wrote:
>
> 1. Hidden service use can't push you over to an unused guard (at all).
> 2. Hidden service use can't influence your choice of guard (at all).
> 3. Exits and websites can't push you over to an unused guard (at all)
> 4. DoS/Guard node downtime signals are rare (absent)
> 5. Nodes are not reused for Guard and Exit positions ("any" positions)
> 6. Information about the guard(s) does not leak to the website/RP (at all).
> 7. Relays in the same family can't be forced to correlate Exit traffic.
I think this list is missing some important user-visible properties, or it's
not clear which property above corresponds to these properties:
* Is Tor reliable and responsive when guards go down, or when I move
networks, or when I have lost and regained service?
I also think it's missing an implicit property, which we should make explicit:
* Can Tor users be fingerprinted by their set of guards or directory guards?
Perhaps this property is out of scope.
T
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