On 2 Dec 2017, at 04:56, Fernando Fernández Mancera <ffernandezmanc...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> If everybody chooses different amounts of data, that makes them easier to >> identify. > > This reason is why it is not recommended to change the default value, same as > for the MaxCircuitDirtiness parameter, so I will specify it on the proposal. If a Tor option has a default value, and we don't recommend changing it, we try to remove that option. So we are unlikely to accept a patch for a new option unless there is some compelling use case for a group of users to set it differently. Otherwise, we would accept code to set a default and keep that default. Onion services may be a use case for this option, because if too much data gets sent through a single circuit, it makes it easy to identify the service's guard. (Of course, this only protects the service if the next circuit uses a different guard, which is not guaranteed.) Alternately, Tor Browser may be a use case for this option, if it wants to manage its circuits itself, regardless of the amount of data they send. T _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
