My colleagues and I published a (not yet peer-reviewed) research paper on how DNS affects Tor's anonymity. The key parts of our work are:
- We measure the DNS setup of exit relays over time, showing that at times Google got to see almost 40% of DNS requests coming out of Tor. - We show how website fingerprinting attacks can be augmented with observed DNS requests, resulting in precise attacks for unpopular websites. - Similar to the "Users Get Routed" work, we simulate the impact of our attack at Internet-scale using the TorPS simulator. The PDF is available online: <https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/tor-dns.pdf> Our project page has code, data, and replication instructions: <https://nymity.ch/tor-dns/> _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
