-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 12/03/15 17:08, A. Johnson wrote: >> Looking forward, hidden-service statistics are now available on >> Metrics: >> >> https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-data.html > > Looks great! > >> - Total hidden-service traffic in Mbit/s (per day, using >> weighted interquartile mean, like lower graph on page 1 of the >> PDF) >> >> - Unique .onion addresses (per day, using weighted interquartile >> mean, like upper graph on page 1 of the PDF) > > These seem like a good idea.
Great! I started with the second graph, because it seems least disputed: https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html >> - Fraction of relays reporting hidden-service statistics >> (containing both dir-onions-seen and rend-relayed-cells, like >> page 3 of the PDF) > > This is probably less interesting to most people, but it is > important to people serious about understanding the meaning of the > data. So I could take this or leave it. Agreed. I'll leave this graph out for the moment. >> Note that I left out "fraction of traffic", because we can't >> guarantee that our many assumptions we made for the blog post >> will hold in the future. Happy to be convinced otherwise. > > The calculation of client traffic fraction assumed that most > traffic from exit relays was in fact exit traffic. The validity of > that assumption may indeed change in the future, depending > especially on how the consensus position weights change. So I agree > that it is not a great idea to include a graph of this number on > the Metrics page. I wonder if we can simplify the calculation somehow, so that we don't have to worry (as much) that it will break in the future. Hmm. > The calculation of traffic fraction at relays only relied on (i) > rendezvous circuits being six hops (not a shaky assumption) and > (ii) that the Metrics numbers for total network traffic was > accurate (also seems like a good assumption). So it seems that we > could include this number, although it is the less interesting of > the two numbers. True. Let's keep this in mind as plan B. >> By the way, I decided against using onion service terminology, >> because I wasn't sure when we were planning to switch. I'm not >> sure if Metrics should be one of the first Tor websites to >> switch, or whether people will just wonder what crazy >> Tor-unrelated stuff Metrics has statistics for. I don't feel >> strongly though. Thoughts? > > You could use the new terminology, with a footnote on the page > explaining that "onion service" is the same as "hidden service". I think I'd rather want to wait until documentation on Tor's website and in tools is updated. All the best, Karsten -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJVAwHAAAoJEJD5dJfVqbCrdJsH/iUuCNMq/R/Yki015ZZ6i7+z OfszriSwUsO4MNuAX7E3yHHlbd5ZDnPJbN+H65wSIrFz2Tu8i1OopORu4EfJLukN 9zpS+SSR0ZoQk4BP8bw0447b46V6GsCy14TLnxUvGBvA1qaYwZM7JKH+RIDkztN/ b1aHf1IxkH92LzxNex/bAkxU6+ivIrRUIC/+/hVa9F2K9FTEbMh1T1WrS9TAukPZ kRW/wqk2wVXgZYV3Vur6bP+5gXOjvXiO5gpKzBv0wVlroCLgOI8idzF1JScQc2AA vEoBr9iFF7JBgtCtnyg6GZNcZvqTIb1/cQ1e2xdYJLluX5UAveNExxC96bCl8lo= =kE9g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev