On 18/09/14 03:31, David Fifield wrote: > Currently in the bundles we're not setting a bridge fingerprint, so > relays wouldn't have to share a key. >
This is something to be *fixed*, not to build future components on top of. Previously you mentioned that "the user could set their circuits to 4 hops" but I think this is a hack of a solution and we can do better, by authenticating the Bridge. In both flashproxy/meek, we're already authenticating the facilitator/reflector, so why should we treat the Bridge any differently? X -- GPG: 4096R/1318EFAC5FBBDBCE git://github.com/infinity0/pubkeys.git
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