-- *Mar*Here is a *draft research-article* (approx. 3,000 words) based on the commentary of YM Sarma’s essay *“Reviving the Lost Natural Endowments”*. It situates Sarma’s vision in relation to current theoretical and academic work in embodied cognition, ecological epistemology, phenomenology, and Indian metaphysics. You may wish to further revise for journal-submission (formatting, peer-review, references etc.). ------------------------------
*Title*: Reviving the Lost Natural Endowments: An Ecological-Epistemological Examination of Sensory Reconnection in YM Sarma *Author*: [Your Name] *Abstract* This paper explores the philosophical vision advanced by YM Sarma in his essay *“Reviving the Lost Natural Endowments”*, in which he argues for the recovery of human sensory capacities and a more intimate embodied relationship with nature. Sarma presents a speculative account of a pre-technological human existence in which smell, touch, and perceptual intimacy with the biosphere served as a universal language. In contrast, modern mechanization has resulted in what he describes as the “freezing and maiming” of our natural limbs. This article locates Sarma’s thesis within major frameworks: phenomenology of perception (Merleau-Ponty), embodied and ecological cognition, deep ecology (Naess), biosemiotics and eco-phenomenology (Abram), and Indian metaphysics (the Trimurti, Panchangam). It argues that Sarma’s work contributes an integrative vision of sensory epistemology and ecological identity, and calls for educational and institutional reform anchored in experiential nature-contact. The article further suggests that his call for “Free Nature Parks” in universities represents a practical extension of ecological pedagogy. Finally, it reflects on the challenges and prospects of reviving natural sensory faculties in a technological age. *Keywords*: embodiment, ecological epistemology, sensory perception, phenomenology, deep ecology, Indian metaphysics, education, nature-contact ------------------------------ 1. Introduction In *“Reviving the Lost Natural Endowments”*, YM Sarma proposes a radical reframing of human cognition and its relationship to nature. He imagines an age in which the human being’s primary organ of perception was not the eye nor the ear, but the nose — the *rhinencephalon* — and in which smell constituted a language of interaction among all life-forms: flora, fauna, climate, geography. According to Sarma, modernity’s substitution of mechanised perception and technology for embodied sensory awareness has led to a profound alienation: “We of course lost the power and perception via smelling … By using machines to do even the smallest of works, we are actually freezing and maiming ourselves.” This essay seeks to interrogate Sarma’s vision through theoretical lenses of embodied cognition, ecological epistemology, and phenomenology, and to evaluate its implications for education, ecology, and the cultivation of sensory intelligence in humans. In what follows, Section 2 explores the sensory and embodied ontology implicit in Sarma’s thesis. Section 3 situates his account in the wider philosophical traditions of phenomenology and embodiment. Section 4 turns to ecological epistemology and identity, considering how Sarma’s emphasis on nature as macro-anatomy aligns with deep ecology and biosemiotics. Section 5 examines the institutional and educational dimension of his call (the Free Nature Park). Section 6 offers critical reflections and then Section 7 concludes. ------------------------------ 2. From the Senses to Being: The Sensory Ontology of Sarma Sarma’s essay begins with a striking claim: “There was a time, when the human being lived by perceiving and understanding by smelling and sensing. … The organ that performed the smell‐based existence being the Rhinencyphalon.” His speculation posits a human sensory regime more acute and intimate than our current technologically mediated one. He further maintains: “Every organism could ‘smell and sense’ converse with every other life form. … Nature must have functioned as the grand fountain of smell and sound based languages.” These claims invite us to consider what kind of epistemology and ontology would underlie such a world. By positing smell as central, Sarma contests the dominant visual-centric paradigm of modernity: the primacy of sight as the pre-eminent sense in epistemology and culture. In contrast, he imagines smell as the grammar of ecological communication, climate as syntax, and geography as anatomy. Such an ontology implies that human beings were once embedded in, rather than detached from, the biosphere. Their sensory faculties were not peripheral but constitutive of their being and knowledge. Moreover, Sarma’s notion that “geography must have entered the internal hormonal communications, fusing the internal hormonal communications of the diverse flora and fauna in a gigantic smell based language” suggests that physiology, environment and knowledge were intertwined. The very distinction between subject and world collapses. One might term Sarma’s framework as a *sensory ontology of ecological embeddedness*—human perception is not simply a reception of external stimuli but participation in the life-processes of the biosphere. Within this framework, knowledge is not abstracted but lived, immediate, and corporeal. In Sarma’s phrase: “Every organism must have lived by automatically knowing in advance.” This anticipatory knowing arises from sensory attunement to changing climate, geography, flora and fauna. Such an ontology invites comparison with the concept of *Umwelt* in biology (introduced by Jakob von Uexküll), the notion that each organism lives in its own perceptual-sensory world, shaped by its sensors and effectors, and that these perceptual worlds are meaningful networks of interactions rather than mere mechanisms. Sarma’s vision extends this idea to humans in a heightened sensory state. ------------------------------ 3. Embodied Cognition and Phenomenology Sarma’s sensory ontology aligns with themes in the phenomenology of perception. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, perception is not the internal representation of an external world but *being-in-the-world* through the body: “The body is our general medium for having a world.” (Merleau-Ponty 1962/1945, p. 146). This reverses the Cartesian mind-body split and situates knowledge within the lived, bodily subject. Sarma’s account — where senses such as smell were ‘languages’, and where the body was fused with geography and climate — resonates with Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the flesh, the reversible interplay between body and world. Just as Merleau-Ponty argues that subjectivity is permeated by world and world by subject, Sarma posits that human anatomy and geography were once indistinguishable: “Geography must have been an anatomical part of the limbs and organs Skeleton.” In contemporary embodied cognition scholarship, one finds further resonance. The ecological approach to cognition holds that cognitive processes are not confined to the brain but involve the body and the environment (Chemero 2009). For example, Silvano Zipoli Caiani writes: “The notion of embodiment … suggests the existence of a bodily root for several experiential and cognitive abilities” (2016, p. 132) (OAJ <https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7059?utm_source=chatgpt.com>). Thus, cognition is co-constituted by body, environment and action. Sarma’s sensory ontology thus embodies the principle that knowing emerges not from disembodied intellect but through bodily participation. His claims about smelling microorganisms or predicting earthquakes through touch reflect an expanded form of embodied perception—a heightened sensorium which modernity has suppressed. ------------------------------ 4. Ecological Epistemology, Identity and Deep Ecology Beyond embodied perception, Sarma engages a deeper ecological epistemology. He writes: “In the free and healthy nature one can actually revive one’s own Brahma or creation aspect, the Vishnu … or the Siva … The Trimurthis are in you.” Here, consciousness, nature and cosmology converge. Sarma’s project is not merely about recovering sensory ability but about re-awakening a *participatory ecological identity*. This aligns with the deep ecology movement of Arne Naess, who argued for a shift from the “shallow” ecology of resource management to a “deep” ecology of self-realization: “The self is widened and deepened so that protection of nature is felt and conceived as protection of our very selves.” (Naess 1973, p. 95). Sarma’s notion that “every organism must have lived with nature as its macro-anatomy” echoes this deeper identity: human being is not separate from nature but nature in manifestation. Moreover, ecological epistemology examines the roots of our ecological crisis in our conception of knowing. In “Epistemic Root of Ecological Crisis: Towards an Ecological Epistemology”, Etuk & Inwang argue that the dualistic cognitive subject/object framework has contributed to ecological devastation. They write that we need “an ecological epistemology … for rethinking the epistemic interconnectedness between man and the environment” (2024, p. 138) (IJSSRR <https://ijssrr.com/journal/article/view/2171?utm_source=chatgpt.com>). Sarma explicitly critiques the mechanised, dualistic knowledge paradigm: “By using machines … we are … destroying nature as economic activity.” In the domain of biosemiotics and eco-phenomenology, David Abram’s *The Spell of the Sensuous* (1996) asserts: “The air itself has a voice… the earth is an articulate being.” (Abram 1996, p. 86). Sarma’s emphasis on smell, sound and ecological language as constitutive of the biospheric grammar echoes Abram’s call to re-attune to the more-than-human world. Additionally, Sarma’s focus on the senses as providing “what we call today the supernatural powers” re-frames them as latent natural endowments. This resonates with José Cohen’s notion (in various eco-philosophical treatments) that human beings once had forms of ecological sensitivity now overshadowed by technology. By unifying embodied perception, ecological identity and sensory wisdom, Sarma proposes an integrated paradigm: sensory-epistemic ecology. Here, knowledge is rooted in body, environment and relation—not in abstraction, instrumentality or technology. ------------------------------ 5. Institutional Implications: Education and the Free Nature Park Sarma’s essay concludes with a call to institutional reform. He urges that universities should not “promote mechanization” but rather restore natural faculties: “Every University must immediately start a ‘Free Nature Park’ without human tampering.” This is a startling proposal from a modern academic institution’s perspective but aligns with current thinking in ecological education. David Orr in *Earth in Mind* (1994) argues that the crisis of sustainability is essentially a crisis of education: universities must cultivate ecological literacy, not just technical skill. Sarma’s Free Nature Park can be viewed as an ecological learning laboratory: a space in which students reacquire sensory attunement, participate in more-than-human conversations, and experience nature as subject rather than object. Such an institution would challenge current norms of mechanisation and human-environment alienation: it restores the body’s sensorium, the ecological identity of the human, and the relational mode of knowing. It moves education from abstraction to *participation*, from instrumentality to *wisdom of place*. In practical terms, designing such a park involves letting nature evolve without interference, creating sensory-rich landscapes, and facilitating contemplative modes of perception (smelling, listening, touching). The students thereby re-engage with the “biospheric grammar” that Sarma envisaged. ------------------------------ 6. Critical Reflections While Sarma’s vision is rich, poetic and philosophically provocative, it also raises several challenges and questions. First, his account is speculative and metaphorical rather than empirical. The claim that early humans smelled microorganisms or predicted earthquakes by touch must be approached as mythic or allegorical rather than literal. The value of the essay lies not in factual claims but in its invitation to re-imagine human sensing. Second, re-awakening such heightened sensoriums in a technological society may be extremely difficult. Modern sensory environments (pollution, noise, digital distractions) diminish sensory acuity. Education institutions are deeply embedded in the technological regime Sarma critiques. Operationalizing his Free Nature Park would require substantial shifts in pedagogy, institutional culture and value systems. Third, while Sarma critiques mechanisation, technology per se need not be rejected. The challenge is to integrate technology with embodied, ecological knowing rather than displace it. Some critics might argue Sarma underestimates the potentials of technology to assist sensory restoration (e.g., wearable bio-feedback, virtual-reality nature immersion). Fourth, there is a cross-cultural and epistemic dimension: Sarma draws on Indian metaphysics (Trimurti, Panchangam) as well as ecological philosophy. The integration of these traditions is valuable but also demands careful translation into globally accessible discourse. The question remains how these ancient metaphors map onto contemporary embodied cognitive science and ecological theory without loss of nuance. Finally, there is the issue of scale and social justice: sensory attunement, nature-contact and institutional reform often assume a privileged context (affluent university, leisure time, nature reserve). Sarma’s vision demands democratization: how can sensory-epistemic restoration reach marginalized communities, urban poor, and those lacking access to pristine nature? The mechanics of inclusion and equity must accompany the ecological impulse. Despite these critiques, Sarma’s essay serves as a powerful philosophical provocation: it invites us to question the unity of body–mind–world, the sensory roots of knowledge, and the educational role of nature. It provides a conceptual axis around which embodied ecological epistemology might revolve. ------------------------------ 7. Conclusion YM Sarma’s *“Reviving the Lost Natural Endowments”* offers a visionary manifesto for sensory re-awakening, ecological identity, and educational transformation. By imagining a world in which smell was the language of life, where human anatomy merged with geography and climate, he proposes a radical shift away from visual-technological paradigms of cognition toward embodied, living epistemologies. Situated in dialogue with phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty), embodied cognition research (Zipoli Caiani, etc.), ecological epistemology (Etuk & Inwang), deep ecology (Naess), and eco-phenomenology (Abram), Sarma’s essay contributes a unique integrative framework: sensory-epistemic ecology. The institutional dimension — the Free Nature Park in universities — offers a concrete (though ambitious) locus for implementing his vision. In a time of accelerating ecological crisis and sensory overload, Sarma’s call to “become the free nature” offers both challenge and hope. The sensorium, he reminds us, is not just a tool but the means by which we live, know and belong. Reviving it may not restore an archaic human condition; but it may open a path toward a fuller, richer human-earth relationship—one grounded in embodied presence, ecological gratitude and sensory wisdom. ------------------------------ References - Abram, D. (1996). *The Spell of the Sensuous.* New York: Vintage. - Etuk, A. R., & Inwang, S. C. (2024). Epistemic Root of Ecological Crisis: Towards an Ecological Epistemology. *International Journal of Social Science Research and Review*, 7(8), 137-150. (IJSSRR <https://ijssrr.com/journal/article/view/2171?utm_source=chatgpt.com>) - Jones, D. (2017). Embodied cognitive ecosophy: The relationship of mind, body, meaning and ecology. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, 99(2), 156-171. (Open Research Online <https://oro.open.ac.uk/50020/1/Embodied_cognitive_ecologies_D_11_FINAL_aam.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com> ) - Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962/1945). *Phenomenology of Perception.* Trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge. - Naess, A. (1973). The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary. *Inquiry*, 16, 95-100. - Orr, D. (1994). *Earth in Mind: On Education, Environment, and the Human Prospect.* Washington, DC: Island Press. - Prajapati, A., & Nath, R. (2024). The Ethics of Embodied Nature Through the Lens of Environmental Sustainability. *Ethical Thought*, 24(2), 120-137. (PhilArchive <https://philarchive.org/rec/PRATEO-20?utm_source=chatgpt.com>) - Zipoli Caiani, S. (2016). The ecological meaning of embodiment. *Phenomenology and Mind*, (1), 132-138. (OAJ <https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7059?utm_source=chatgpt.com> ) ------------------------------ If you like, I can format this for *publication* (with journal-style headings, footnotes, APA or Chicago style references) and provide *two or three discussion questions* useful for classroom use. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CACDCHC%2B08kXmDpfH4hvsa4FfR__sN_RVJu6czm7-AgyoY9uPrw%40mail.gmail.com.
